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
 
This article challenges the consensus that International Criminal Law (ICL) was “born” at Nuremberg, 
exposing ICL’s true history, which spans centuries. Jurists regard pre-WWII cases of penal enforcement 
of the laws of war as unrelated to present-day ICL, because, presumably, these cases are:  (1) rare, (2) 
domestic measures that (3) lack a common doctrine. That is false. ICL’s development, from the late 
Middle-Ages until WWII, has been grounded on a transnational doctrine which considered as 
international “outlaws” (punishable by all) violators of the laws of war (war criminals) and of certain 
additional international laws (from which “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against peace” 
developed). Remnants of this doctrine are still present in ICL.  Penal action against violators was non-
negligible and the forums that executed it were not mere domestic organs. After presenting ICL’s 
centuries-long history and the causes of its pretermission, the article concludes that this forgotten past 
must be acknowledged. The current narrative falsely depicts ICL as an abnormal system, recently created 
in violation of basic principles of criminal justice. Furthermore, it encourages the disregard of most ICL 
cases (those conducted at the State level). Hence, this “false history” leads to unjustifiable questioning of 
ICL’s legitimacy and effectiveness. 
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At the close of WWII, Churchill suggested summarily executing the remaining Nazi 
leadership. Roosevelt disagreed, insisting on prosecuting them in an international military 
tribunal. This is considered the “birth” of International Criminal Law (ICL),1 following a 
consensus that “[t]he Nazi atrocities gave rise to the idea that some crimes are so grave as to 
concern the international community as a whole.”2 Few earlier instances of penal action against 
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violators of the laws of war are acknowledged. But, they are dismissed as unrelated to current 
ICL, because (presumably) they are sporadic domestic actions that lack a common doctrine.
3
 
The present article challenges this construction of ICL history. Pre-WWII penal enforcement 
of the laws of war was: (a) non-negligible; (b) in all instances the same transnational doctrine 
(still part of ICL to some extent) was applied; and (c) the forums that tried the perpetrators were 
not merely domestic organs. Furthermore, “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against peace” 
(“aggression”) also have a long pre-WWII history.  Simply put, notwithstanding the significance 
of post-WWII trials, ICL history stretches for nearly a millennium.  
Part 1 discusses preliminary indications that pre-WWII penal enforcement of the laws of war 
was doctrinally related to post-WWII ICL, pointing to evidence of “outlawry” as a common 
doctrinal thread. Parts 2 and 3 discuss methodological issues. Parts 4 and 5 trace the origins of 
the outlawry doctrine and its relation to ICL. Part 6 discusses the pre-WWII history of Crimes 
Against Humanity. Part 7 explores key reasons for the predominance of the current narrative 
about ICL history. Part 8 exposes the harms caused by the current historical misperception.   
1. Acknowledged Pre-WWII Cases  
When ICL’s history is currently described, only six pre-WWII events are typically noted: 
the medieval trials of Conradin, King of Jerusalem (1268), William Wallace (1305) and Peter 
von-Hagenbach (1474) for violating the “laws of God and man” (a term used for centuries to 
describe international law); the proposal to execute Napoleon for starting war in violation of 
international commitments (1815); the adoption (1863) and enforcement of the Lieber Code 
during the American Civil War (1861-1865); and the WWI proposals to prosecute the Kaiser and 
other German war criminals. Yet, after being briefly noted, these cases are usually deemed 
irrelevant to present-day ICL, mainly for being sporadic and lacking a common legal doctrine.
4
 
Piracy is the only international crime with a recognized pedigree, due to the application of 
the same transnational doctrine for centuries across nations. According to this doctrine, universal 
jurisdiction applies because “a pirate [is] an outlaw [and] a ‘hostis humani generis’ [enemy of 
mankind]” for violating international law.5 That doctrine contained, until recently, additional 
elements: (a) pirates were referred to by synonyms
6
 of the term “outlaws”, such as “disturbers of 
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the peace”7 and “enemies of peace”8; (b) death was the universal maximum sentence for piracy 
and it was executed summarily or following a military trial.
9
  
Currently, universal jurisdiction applies also to perpetrators of “core international crimes” 
(“War Crimes,” “Crimes Against Humanity,” “Crimes Against Peace” (“Aggression”), and 
“Genocide”), which, presumably, turns “the power of criminal punishment against the hostis 
humani generis, the enemy of mankind, the universal outlaw, expressions historically associated 
with the pirate.”10 Namely, the application of universal jurisdiction to such crimes is assumed to 
be a post-WWII development accomplished by adopting the international outlawry doctrine from 
piracy law. But, examination of the six pre-WWII cases reveals a recurring “outlawry format”, 
suggesting a centuries-long application of a transnational doctrine, similar to piracy law. 
Contemporary jurists depict Conradin’s case (1268) as an ancient conviction for “crimes 
against peace”, as he was tried for instigating an unjust war (due to papal opposition) to become 
the King of Sicily.
11
 This depiction ignores that Conradin was convicted by a panel of knights 
(military tribunal) and executed as “a disturber of the public peace [i.e. outlaw]… and the 
usurper of a kingdom, which the pope had granted to another.”12 In some accounts, Conradin was 
further held “responsible for all the excesses [i.e. war crimes] of [his] German soldiery.”13  
Conradin’s Execution14 
 
According to 14th-century jurist Giovanni da-Legnano, Conradin was beheaded because “disturbance of 
the peace [was] not feared.”15 
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In what jurists commonly describe as “the earliest recorded trial… for war crimes,”16 
William Wallace was tried in 1305, for “sparing neither age nor sex, monk nor nun” in a Scottish 
campaign he led against England. Conradin’s earlier war crimes conviction refutes this. 
Moreover, an outlawry format has currently gone unnoticed: “Wallace was drawn for treason, 
hanged for robbery and homicide, disemboweled for sacrilege, beheaded as an outlaw and 
quartered for divers[e] depredations,”17 after being convicted by a military tribunal.18 
Wallace’s Trial19 
 
King Edward in a letter to the Pope referred to Wallace and his men as “enemies of peace.”20 
Peter von-Hagenbach was appointed governor of Breisach by the Duke of Burgundy, who 
had conquered it for ransom. As governor, von-Hagenbach orchestrated atrocities against locals. 
Current ICL scholarship describes that, in 1474, after the occupation ended, he was sentenced to 
death for murder, rape, and other crimes against the laws of God, by a tribunal comprised of 
judges from several princedoms. Some, therefore, consider this case the earliest trial by a 
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transnational criminal tribunal and the only one before Nuremberg.
21
 Contemporary jurists rarely 
mention that von-Hagenbach was tried by a military tribunal and convicted of tyranny.
22
 The 
tyranny conviction is significant because for centuries, such charges rendered individuals “hostes 
humani generis--international outlaws--who fall within the scope of ‘universal jurisdiction’ and, 
as the way of pirates, were ‘to be hanged by the first persons into whose hands they fall.’”23 
Von-Hagenbach’s Beheading24 
 
Von-Hagenbach is still remembered as a tyrant. The French Moments tourism site, e.g., states 
that “a focal point [in Colmar’s Unterlinden Museum] is the mummified head of local tyrant, 
Peter von-Hagenbach.”25 
Napoleon’s case (1815) is often presented as a failed attempt to punish a perpetrator of 
“crimes against peace”. The reality was more complex. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna, an 
international body representing most European countries, declared Napoleon “an Enemy and 
Disturber of the Tranquility of the World [i.e. outlaw], that he has incurred public vengeance,” 
for “violating the convention which established him in the Island of Elba” and “reappearing in 
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France with projects of disorder and destruction”.26 The British Prime Minister argued that 
Napoleon could be considered a “captain of freebooters or banditti and consequently out of the 
pale of protection of nations [that] headed his expedition as an outlaw and an outcast; hostis 
humani generis.”27 Prussian Field-Marshal Blucher declared Napoleon an “outlaw,” wanted dead 
or alive.
28
 Eventually, Napoleon was captured and perpetually detained without trial “for the 
Preservation of the Tranquility of Europe.”29   
Napoleon’s Outlawry  
 
An 1813 pamphlet, asserting, based on international law, that Napoleon should be declared 
an outlaw.30   
Notice that the British Prime Minister equated Napoleon to a pirate (“freebooter”) over a 
century before WWII. This contradicts the premise that the link between core international 
crimes and piracy is a recent development. Furthermore, by comparing Napoleon to a bandit, he 
was using a term then applied, together with “brigands” and “bush-whackers,” to unlawful 
combatants, toward whom an international outlawry doctrine had also been employed for 
centuries.
31
 During the American Civil War, e.g., the Union routinely deemed Southern unlawful 
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combatants “outlaws”/“enemies of mankind” and executed them summarily or following a 
military trial.
32
  
The Union’s Outlawry of Confederate Irregulars 
 
A Union military decree, referring to Confederate irregulars as the “common foe of 
mankind” and declaring that they would be hung upon capture as they are “entitled to none 
of the rights accorded by the laws of war to honorable belligerents.”33 
Outlawry was invoked by the Union also with regard to regular Southern soldiers who had 
violated the laws of war, as in the case of Confederate Captain Henry Wirz. Horrific atrocities 
were committed during Wirz’s command of the Andersonville POW camp. After the war, he was 
sentenced to death by a military commission for conspiring with others “to injure the health and 
destroy the lives of… prisoners of war… in violation of the law of war.”34 At trial, the Judge-
Advocate declared that the conspirators had “forfeited all rights… they are outlaws and 
criminals.”35  
                                                          
32
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33
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Wirz’s Execution36 
 
It is difficult to dismiss something as insignificant when it is carried out on Capitol Hill. 
Similarly, the Confederates deemed Northern soldiers they accused of war crimes outlaws. 
For example, Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, accused Union General, Benjamin Butler, 
of violating the laws of war by executing certain Southern civilians, and declared that Butler 
would be summarily executed if captured, as “an outlaw and common enemy of mankind.”37 
Outlawry was often invoked in reference to German WWI submariners for their attacks on 
civilian ships. For example, in his congressional declaration of war, President Wilson stated that 
because of their “wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants… [t]he 
present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind” and 
“[b]ecause [German] submarines are in effect outlaws… [i]t is… necessity indeed, to endeavour 
to destroy them before they have shown their own intention.”38  
Outlawry was also applied in reference to the Kaiser. During a British War Cabinet meeting, 
in 1918, Lord Curzon reported that French Prime Minister Clemenceau had suggested “treating 
the Kaiser as a universal outlaw [for violating international law] so that there should be no land 
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in which he could set his foot.”39 Subsequently, the Cabinet appointed a legal commission, which 
concluded that international law authorized punishing the Kaiser either by trial or summarily “as 
Napoleon was treated.”40 
WWI 
German Submariners’ Outlawry The Kaiser’s Outlawry 
  
Part of a report from The Evening Post 13 
(April 14, 1917).41 
Part of a report from The Dominion 6 (Sep. 8, 
1917): “the Kaiser and his War lords… may 
well dream of… banishment, or even a felon’s 
death. America… marks them as the outlaws 
of our civilization.”  
                                                          
39
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Recall the event commonly described as the “birth” of ICL: Roosevelt’s opposition to 
Churchill’s summary execution proposal. The basis of Churchill’s proposal was “the old-
fashioned idea of the ‘outlaw’”.42 He suggested that a committee of jurists compile a list of arch-
war-criminals who would be deemed international outlaws by a joint decree of the Allies, and if 
one of them were to fall into Allied hands, the nearest Major-General would convene a Court of 
Inquiry, not to determine guilt but “to establish the fact of identification [after which the] officer 
will have the outlaw or outlaws shot to death within six hours and without reference to higher 
authority.”43 Churchill’s idea of summarily executing war criminals within six hours from 
capture “became the policy of the British government from 1943 until the very end of the war.”44  
Supporters of Roosevelt’s tribunal proposition also relied on outlawry. An American 
Memorandum from 1944 on the “Trial of War Criminal by Mixed Inter-Allied Military 
Tribunals” stated that “[i]t is fundamental in considering th[e] question [of universal jurisdiction] 
to bear in mind that for the past century at least war crim[inals]… have been considered… 
‘enemies of mankind’… ‘hostis humani generis’… ‘outlaws’”.45 
WWII 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Richard Overy, “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making,” in From Nuremberg to The Hague, ed. 
Philippe Sands (2003), 3-4. 
43
 Note by Churchill (Nov. 9, 1943), cited in Arieh Kochavi , Prelude to Nuremberg (1998), 73-74 (emphasis added). 
44
 Overy, “Nuremberg Trials,” 3-4. 
45
 (31 August 1944), 4, available at http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e5f070/ (emphasis added). 
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In sum, an outlawry format similar to that of piracy cases is present in all commonly 
recognized pre-WWII war crimes cases, challenging the premise that these were not part of the 
doctrinal evolution that produced current ICL. 
2. The “Modern State Conception” and Nineteenth-Century Positivism 
It is intuitively assumed that criminal justice systems must have a centralized law-
enforcement structure, because no such system “execute[s] the penal laws of another.”46 Penal 
laws are also assumed to be generally aimed at protecting the interests of the legal system’s local 
community, which often places jurisdictional (usually territorial) limits on their enforcement. 
These laws are further expected to be formally legislated by an official body.
47
 Put differently, it 
is intuitively assumed that: “Criminal justice presupposes sovereign States”.48  
But, as Hathaway and Shapiro pointed out, this “Modern State Conception is both an 
excessively narrow and historically incomplete account of law. Legal systems can and have 
existed despite lacking the capacities of a modern state.”49 In pre-State Germanic tribes, e.g., 
penal law was unlegislated and law-enforcement was outsourced by entitling everyone to extra-
judicially kill criminals.
50
 Moreover, not only obsolete legal systems are characterized by 
decentralization. Contemporary international law shares considerable attributes of 
decentralization with pre-State Germanic legal systems. Scholars have pointed out this fact to 
refute the claim of international law’s opponents that it is not truly a legal system due to 
dissimilarities between it and modern domestic legal systems.
51
 Support for this unjustified de-
legitimation of international law is considerably due to the intuitive endorsement of the “Modern 
State Conception.” 
The inaccuracy of this conception is further evident in the fact that even some contemporary 
domestic systems exhibit elements of decentralization. In Scotland, the legislative function is 
somewhat decentralized, as some crimes are unlegislated and judges have inherent “declaratory 
power” to “find” additional conduct to be criminal.52 Many Continental European systems 
                                                          
46
 The Antelope, 23 US (1825), 123. 
47
 Morten Bergsmo and LING Yan, “On State Sovereignty and Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core 
International Crimes,” in State Sovereignty and International Criminal Law, ed. M. Bergsmo et. al. (2012), 4. 
48
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 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, “Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law,” Yale Law 
Journal 121 (2011): 258.  
50
 Ibid, 282-290. 
51
 Hathaway, Shapiro, “Enforcement,” 299; Stanley Anderson, “Human Rights and the Structure of International 
Law,” New-York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 12 (1991): 2-5. 
52
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support some decentralization of law-enforcement through judex loci deprehensionis, a doctrine 
which allows, under certain conditions, prosecuting foreigners for committing acts defined as 
crimes by the foreign law of their place of commission, even if the prosecuting State and its 
citizens were not affected by these acts.
53
  
It is not completely coincidental that these domestic systems exhibit attributes that partially 
resemble Germanic systems, as they have originated from such systems. Interestingly, the 
Germanic doctrine that served as the basis for the outsourcing of law-enforcement was outlawry, 
which originally permitted killing on-sight anyone deemed an “outlaw” for having committed a 
grave crime.
54
 This doctrine’s conflation, during the late Middle-Ages, with somewhat similar 
Roman-Christian doctrines is recognized as pivotal to the development of domestic criminal 
justice, and more generally, to the rise of the modern State.
55
 As this article reveals, international 
law’s resemblance to Germanic systems is similarly non-coincidental; ICL’s history, which is 
much longer than assumed, is also bound to the outlawry doctrine. 
The intuitive endorsement of the “Modern State Conception” is a main cause for the 
disregard of ICL’s long history. Nineteenth-century positivism has propagated this flawed 
conception of legal systems, as many positivists maintained that penal law is “necessarily of a 
positive, local existence”.56 Nineteenth-century positivism has motivated considerable reforms in 
domestic law. As a result, most criminal justice systems came to resemble the model many 
positivists supported, and they still maintain these qualities, despite the fact that positivism itself 
no longer supports the narrow perception of legal systems that nineteenth-century positivists 
commonly supported.
57
 Individuals unconsciously tend to generalize from personal experiences 
and prevailing paradigms, and presently “the legal systems…most familiar [to us] are domestic 
[and] modern state regimes are the paradigm instances of law.”58 This unconscious tendency and 
the contribution of nineteenth-century positivism to the shaping of contemporary domestic 
                                                          
53
 Zhu Lijiang, The Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute and Universal Jurisdiction of States 
(University of Lund: LL.M. Thesis, 2005), 15.   
54
 Maurice Keen, The Outlaws of Medieval Legend (1961), 9-10. 
55
 Pollock, Maitland, History of English Law, 2:328; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (1998), 63. 
56
 John M. Goodenow, Historical Sketches of the Principles and Maxims of American Jurisprudence (1819), 3. See 
also, J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883), 2:62-63.  
57
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary 
Practice,” Virginia Journal of International Law 42 (2001): 99; Ronald Dworkin, “A New Philosophy for 
International Law,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41 (2013): 3-4. 
58
 Hathaway, Shapiro, “Enforcement,” 257.  
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systems jointly lead to the intuitive reliance on the “Modern State Conception.” Uncovering 
ICL’s long, outlawry-related history demands confronting this flawed conception. Therefore, I 
mention and refute various nineteenth-century positivist propositions throughout the article. 
To clarify, nineteenth-century positivism was a diverse jurisprudential school, whose 
proponents’ positions regarding international law considerably varied.59 This article is bound to 
fail to do full justice to this diversity due to space constraints, which necessitate focusing on anti-
ICL, nineteenth-century positivist views, as these played a significant role in the pretermission of 
ICL history. Interestingly, even these positions varied in their attitude toward international law. 
Austin, the period’s leading positivist, defined “law” as a command backed by threats of 
sanctions issued by a sovereign. Based on this definition, he concluded that international law (not 
only ICL) is not “law” but mere “positive international morality.”60 Others adopted a dualistic 
position that perceives domestic and international law as two substantially different legal 
systems, the former regulating individuals and the latter coordinating between States. This 
perspective still rejects ICL, because ICL is addressed to individuals.
61
    
3. Genealogical Accounts  
This article gradually presents ICL’s long history and uncovers its persistent reliance on 
outlawry. But, some international legal historians are averse to such genealogical accounts of the 
origins of contemporary international norms and institutions, due to the teleological and 
anachronistic tendencies of such accounts.
62
 Genealogical accounts also tend to mistakenly 
regard the original application of a doctrine as the explanation for each of its iterations, even 
though tracing back a doctrine’s iterations up to the first application does not provide such an 
explanation. It only raises the question: why was the same doctrine applied in all of the different 
instances?
63
  
Some argue that in each instance a legal doctrine is applied because of the case-specific, 
non-legal interests of the powerful, and the pretense of applying a long-standing legal doctrine is 
used to conceal these non-legal interests.
64
 Others argue that even if domestic law can affect the 
                                                          
59
 Stephen Hall, “The Persistent Spectre: Natural, Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism,” 
European Journal of International law 12 (2001): 271. 
60
 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), 208. See also, Stephen, Criminal Law, 2:62-63.  
61
 See Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law (1998), 35.  
62
 Randall Lesaffer, “International Law and Its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love,” in Time, History and 
International Law, ed. Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (2007), 34. 
63
 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 24-32. 
64
 Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (1993), 152. 
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behavior of the powerful, international law cannot.
65
 If one of these views is correct, a 
genealogical account of ICL is uninteresting because each application of ICL is “truly” 
determined by the case-specific power balance.
66
  
Yet, there is nothing necessarily anachronistic or teleological about a genealogical account,
67
 
especially when it concludes that “we are looking at a continuum, albeit not a linear one. While 
there have been important discontinuities along the way these do not lead to what might be 
termed a dis-continuum.”68 As Bourdieu further pointed out, “[t]he social practices of the law 
are… the product of the functioning of a ‘field’ whose specific logic is determined by two 
factors:… the specific power relations [and] the internal logic of juridical functioning which 
constantly constrains the range of possible actions and, thereby, limits the realm of specifically 
juridical solutions.”69 Although the pre-existence of a legal doctrine is usually not the sole reason 
for any of its iterations, it may provide a partial explanation for each such iteration, because such 
“past gives us vocabulary, and that vocabulary in turn shapes the very way we think of a 
problem”.70 In ICL’s case, the relevant vocabulary depicts violators of certain international laws 
as enemies of mankind/outlaws. Laws, therefore, often have effects that go beyond concealing 
non-legal motivations and even the powerful are susceptible to such effects. This is true for both 
domestic and international law.
71
 Thus, the history of the independent effect of international laws 
should be researched, and genealogical accounts are crucial for such research because the 
internal logic of the law relies “upon precedent, customs and patterns of argument stretching 
back [in time].”72  
Admittedly, during power struggles, legal uncertainty often exists, as opponents tend to 
disagree on the interpretation of the relevant law. But the law still has some influence, forcing 
the sides to structure their claims in a certain manner and limiting the legitimate interpretational 
possibilities.
73
 Jus ad bellum, for example, because of the strategic issues it addresses, has always 
been more exposed to power struggles than most other laws of war. Its norms, therefore, often 
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suffer from uncertainty and political “abuse.” But historical research of various centuries has 
shown that even jus ad bellum often has independent influence.
74
 
According to the genealogical account below, ICL continuously existed since the late 
Middle-Ages. This could raise another inaccuracy concern, because many international legal 
historians consider international law to be a late nineteenth-century innovation, pointing to 
several points of discontinuity with earlier transnational law.
75
  
One such claimed point of discontinuity is the transition from the European jus gentium to 
the contemporary global system of international law.
76
 But, this transition, in the context of ICL, 
did not occur in the form of a rupture. Originally, the European jus gentium (ICL included) was a 
trans-Christian/European/Western system whose members (egocentrically) regarded themselves 
as “mankind”/“humanity”,77 and it was prescribed to wage total war, without any jus in bello 
restrictions, against non-Christian nations, which were referred to as 
“uncivilized”/“barbarians”/“savages” (and for several centuries “infidels”).78  
But, in practice, even during the late Middle-Ages and Early Modern Times, in some wars 
between Christians/Europeans/Westerners and non-Christians/Europeans/Westerners, jus in bello 
restrictions were applied.
79
  There are even such cross-cultural wars in which certain mutely-
accepted applications of ICL can be detected.
80
  
                                                          
74
 E.g. Theodor Meron, Bloody Constraint (1998), 23; Lesaffer, “Unrequited Love,” 37.   
75
 Anne Orford, “The Past as Law or History: The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law” (New-
York University: International Law and Justice Working Papers, 2012), 1-3 (discussing such positions).  
76
 See ibid. 
77
 Jennifer Pitts, “Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century,” American Historical Review 117 
(2012): 92; Liliana Obregón, “The Civilized and the Uncivilized,” in Oxford Handbook of The History of 
International Law, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (2012), 930. 
78
 Frederick Russell, The Just War in the Middle-Ages (1979), 7-8. Presumably, during Early Modern Times, 
“infidels” ceased to be a category of enemies against whom jus ad bellum permitted waging total, as a result of the 
secularization of international law. But, the reality is that some continued to support that doctrine long after we 
might tend to presume. See, e.g., Hew Strachan, “A General Typology of Transcultural Wars: The Modern-Ages,” 
in Transcultural Wars: From the Middle-Ages to the 21st Century, ed. Hans-Henning Kortum (2006), 87-89. 
79
 Bernhard R. Kroener, “Antichrist, Archenemy, Disturber of the Peace: Forms and Means of Violent Conflicts in 
the Early Modern Ages,” in Transcultural Wars, 61, 80; James Drake, “Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King 
Philip’s War”, New England Quarterly 70 (1997): 34; Stephen Morillo, “A General Typology of Transcultural 
Wars: The Early Middle Ages and Beyond,” in Transcultural Wars, 36, 41; Matthew Strickland, “Rules of War or 
War Without Rules?”, in Transcultural Wars, 109, 128, 131-132, 137-139. 
80
 E.g., José Enrique López, “Institutions on the Castalian-Granadan Border” in Medieval Frontier Societies, ed. R. 
Bartlett and A. Mackay (1989):127-150. See also the 17th- and 18th-century examples mentioned in note 531 below.   
-DRAFT- 
 
16 
 
Case-specific political considerations explain, in part, the variation in conduct between 
different cross-cultural wars.
81
 After all, determining that an enemy belonged to a category that 
justified waging total war was an ad bellum legal matter and thus especially susceptible in its 
application to the influence of such considerations. 
Nevertheless, the law itself also had an influence in constraining war-time conduct in such 
cross-cultural wars. “European thought about the law governing interactions among states and 
peoples--ius gentium, law of nations, international law--has… always existed in a space of 
tension between the European and the universal.”82 Due to this incoherent duality, throughout the 
history of international law, both sources that conceptualized it as universally applicable and 
sources that regarded it as only applicable to Christians/Europeans/Westerners existed; although, 
the extent of support for each position (universalist or exclusionary) varied between different 
periods.
83
 The likelihood that a decision to wage total war would be made, was, mostly likely, 
influenced by the fluctuating support for universalist positions.
84
 It should also be noted that, due 
to the influence of certain universalist positions, already before the late nineteenth century there 
were some cases where ICL was applied on the basis of a universalist, human-rights-oriented 
perspective.
85
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A comparison of different accounts that depict the coming into being of the current global 
system as resulting from a rupture reveals considerable discrepancy regarding the time in which 
globalization has presumably occurred--with various dates, ranging from the late nineteenth 
century to the 1970s, being suggested.
86
 As these issues are closely related,
87
 it is unsurprising 
that a difficulty similarly exists in pin-pointing the time in which the ad bellum doctrine 
permitting waging total war against non-Christians/Europeans/Westerners was abandoned.
88
 
These difficulties are, at least in part, due to the fact that throughout this century-long period (as 
in previous times), in some conflicts, all parties--Westerners and non-Westerners alike--
recognized the applicability of the (originally European) laws of war,
89
 while in others, Western 
belligerents waged total war against their non-Western opponents (some of them, in fact, up until 
WWII, even explicitly justified their actions based on the horrid ad bellum doctrine regarding 
“uncivilized” nations).90 Hence, the abandonment of the ad bellum doctrine regarding 
“uncivilized” nations was clearly not the result of a rupture, but of a nonlinear, long process.  
Not only jus ad bellum influenced decisions whether to wage total war. At times, the 
conventional (originally European) jus in bello also had a moderating influence. Humanitarian 
considerations embedded in these norms influenced the decision of at least some commanders 
not to wage total war.
91
 Furthermore, once a decision was made not to wage total war (for 
whatever reason), European forces often turned to the wartime legal code of conduct familiar to 
them; although, due to the reciprocal nature of warfare, often, the norms familiar to the other side 
also had an influence on the mutually adopted legal code of conduct.
92
 Since the eighteenth 
century, however, as the power gap between European/Western forces and non-
European/Western forces grew, increasingly, the European norms were simply imposed upon 
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non-European forces.
93
 The signing by non-Western countries on the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries codifying treaties of the laws of war further contributed to these norms’ globalization.94  
The increasing adoption of the originally European jus in bello was not a linear process.
95
 
Also, contrary to the way many Western jurists still wrongly imagine it to be, this process was 
not the result of “civilization‘s” progression,96 but of various factors, many of them coercive, 
such as: (a) forced acculturation; (b) the use of non-Western forces by Western/European 
colonialist nations; and (c) the adoption of these laws by non-Western/European nations to 
reduce Western/European nations’ ability to justify waging total war against them.97 The 
adoption of these originally European in bello laws by non-Western/European nations was 
further influenced by the fact that “military culture [is] possessed of its own imitative 
dynamics”,98 since “[w]ar is a competitive and reciprocal activity… [t]he common culture of 
armed forces… has a function, whose robustness frequently prevails over national and political 
differences.”99 As a result of the expanding adoption of these laws, most contemporary laws of 
war are identical to, or gradually developed from, the past European laws of war.
100
 Thus, in the 
context of jus in bello as well, globalization did not occur in the form of a rupture.  
 
 
 
It is agreed in the treaty that both pirates and killers of hors de combat “shall be accounted… enem[ies] of 
all mankind” (implicitly regarding the latter by deeming the act a form of piracy).101 
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Some international legal historians argue that international law was born only in the 
nineteenth century due to the shift experienced from natural law jurisprudence to positivism, 
which, presumably, rationalized international law.
102
 This claim is inaccurate. Positivism was not 
the first jurisprudential school to claim to rationalize international law; secular natural law 
preceded it, albeit claiming to attain this aim in a different manner.
103
 Furthermore, in nearly all 
periods, including the nineteenth century, various jurisprudential schools existed, as well as 
many positions within each school regarding obedience to international law. Moreover, jurists 
who mainly followed a certain jurisprudential school often accepted elements of other schools.
104
  
Because of the absence of jurisprudential uniformity, many international legal historians no 
longer focus on theories of law to characterize different periods but examine each “period’s legal 
consciousness, understood as the ensemble of categories, concepts, typical arguments, 
argumentative techniques, and so forth, that characterize the work of [practitioners] and scholars 
of that period.”105 Interestingly, many legal historians who adopt such a basis for periodization 
still conclude that a rupture occurred during the nineteenth century; according to their position, it 
occurred due to the rise of the modern international legal profession.
106
 In this aspect, however, 
the laws of war, including ICL, differ from other areas of international law. For centuries, this 
body of law was enforced predominantly by a discrete military subculture,
107
 which moderated 
the effect of nineteenth-century transformations (as well as earlier ones).
108
 
The exact extent of penal enforcement of the laws of war (ICL) is unverifiable because the 
relevant historical evidence is partial and usually in the form of brief secondary reports.
109
 But, 
the abundance of such reports leads many historians that examine military practices to conclude 
that during the late Middle-Ages penal enforcement of the laws of war was non-negligible and at 
least in some aspects “the laws of war in the Age of Chivalry are the direct ancestors of the 
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Geneva Conventions.”110 Regarding subsequent periods, Parker explains, historical evidence 
leads many historians to conclude:
111
  
The rules of war followed by most European societies both at home and abroad have 
thus displayed a remarkable continuity since the sixteenth century. This stems in part 
from the relative stability of human nature--the advantages of cooperation and the 
danger of total collapse were apparent to Renaissance soldiers as they are today--in part 
from the lasting influence of the Bible, the Church Fathers and Roman Law on Western 
Civilization. But both of these considerations received reinforcement from the weight of 
practice and precedent--by frequent appeal to custom in assessing military conduct. It is 
true that the theoretical restrictions of the jus in bello have multiplied; it is also true that 
those restrictions have been breached at regular intervals. But almost every excess, from 
the sixteenth century onward, has been subject by contemporaries to detailed scrutiny… 
And if no excuses were available, moral condemnation and then legal sanctions ensued. 
Most of the actions today outlawed by the Geneva Conventions have been condemned 
in the West for at least four centuries; only the degree and the extent of enforcement has 
changed over time. 
And:
112
 
[I]n most of the wars waged in Europe since the sixteenth century, breaches of the 
norms for military conduct laid down in treatises… have been condemned and chastised 
with increasing rigor. Individual soldiers faced trial and punishment by special military 
tribunals for crimes committed against either fellow soldiers or civilians. 
Furthermore, “modern armies (perhaps from as early as the late 18th century) shared a culture of 
war that gave their formal wars an intercultural character even when the broader cultures were 
different”.113 Hence, “many aspects of the eighteenth-century norm also survived the two world 
wars of the twentieth century [and are currently shared] not only [by] those which have 
eighteenth-century antecedents but also [by] more recent creations [that were] persuaded that 
such patterns of behavior are the foundations of military culture… modern armies behave as 
though they are bound by a common culture”.114  
Thus, despite the undeniable elements of discontinuity (militaries, norms and jurisprudence 
changed, the spatial applicability of the law varied, and enforcement levels fluctuated), 
considerable continuity exists both in the content of the laws of war and in their social 
acceptance and penal enforcement (ICL).  
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The disparity between the aforementioned continuity findings and the prevalent rupture 
depiction among international legal historians may also be resulting from another issue. 
According to Lesaffer, “[o]ften international legal historians consider [jurisprudential writing] to 
be convenient shorthand of what the international law of a certain period was”.115 This is 
problematic. Such sources are often biased and “[i]n most eras of history… practices and 
customary law constituted a more important source for the law of nations”.116 Trying to 
determine the continued existence of a legal system by examining jurisprudential writings may 
also result, as hereinafter explained, in misdirected research.  
No consensual definition exists for a “legal system.”117 Still, many believe that a legal 
system exists, in the sociological sense, when the bulk of community members or officials have 
come to accept, as a social convention, certain norms as obligatory.
118
 Such acceptance can exist 
even when individuals disagree about the jurisprudential basis for their duty to abide by these 
laws.
119
 Disagreements may also exist on whether specific norms are part of the system.
120
 Also, 
often, the contours of the community are undefined and changing.
121
 The normative force of a 
legal system can, therefore, fluctuate across time, places, and issues.  
Such normative force should be distinguished from adherence and enforcement because 
even individuals who recognize a certain norm as binding may nevertheless decide not to follow 
it.
122
 Admittedly, a legal system cannot exist over time if it continuously fails to have behavioral 
effects. But occasional unpunished violations do not render it meaningless. Indeed, the core 
“function of the legal system may be defined as producing and maintaining counter-factual 
expectations in spite of disappointments.”123  
This sociological definition of a legal system helps identify a dis-continuum in its history. 
Considerable aspects of discontinuity are bound to be experienced by a legal system over time 
in: (a) community contours; (b) the amount and identity of community-members or officials 
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committed to its norms; (c) acceptance level and content of various norms; (d) members’ 
jurisprudential beliefs; and (e) obedience and enforcement levels. Nevertheless, a dis-continuum 
should not be declared, as long as a social convention--generally regarding the system’s norms as 
obligatory--persists among most community-members/officials.  
This definition of a dis-continuum lends support to historians’ conclusion that evidence 
regarding military practices indicates a centuries-long continuity in ICL history. International 
jurists, however, impose additional conditions for acknowledging such continuity--holding pre-
WWII cases of penal enforcement of the laws of war to be irrelevant to present-day ICL, for 
presumably being: (a) rare (and thus insignificant); (b) domestic; and (3) bereft of a common 
doctrine.
124
 The aforementioned abundant historical evidence refutes the rarity presumption. The 
two other presumptions are refuted below. 
Two brief clarifications are in order. First, this article exposes the continuous reliance of 
ICL cases over the centuries on the international outlawry doctrine to refute the premise that past 
cases lack a shared doctrine. There is no intent here to imply that other factors (such as political 
interests) did not also influence the parties’ actions. Second, because of the pivotal role war 
crime prosecutions played in ICL history, the terms “penal enforcement of the laws of war” and 
“ICL” are often used interchangeably. Such use does not suggest that all other core international 
crimes are post-WWII innovations; their pre-WWII history is addressed below.   
4. Outlawry’s Origins 
a. Germanic Law  
Under Germanic law, individuals were deemed outlaws for wronging the entire community, 
making it “the right… of every man… to hunt [them] down… and slay [them].”125 Outlaws were 
not necessarily executed. Society was granted control over their lives and this perspective 
gradually gave rise to additional forms of punishment, such as indefinite imprisonment and exile. 
Individuals referred to as “banned”/“exiled”/“banished” were, from a legal perspective, outlaws 
whose lives had been spared.
126
 This evolution of punishments, which occurred during the late 
Middle-Ages, played a pivotal role in the development of criminal law: “many of the pure 
punishments… have their root in outlawry.”127   
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Originally, two forms of outlawry existed: “decreed” outlawry and outlawry of “manifest 
criminality.” The former refers to actions requiring a semi-judicial decree after their commission, 
declaring the perpetrators “outlaws.” This procedure was applied primarily to individuals who 
had prevented the administration of justice.
128
 Manifest criminality refers to acts that instantly 
reveal individuals’ “true” outlaw nature, allowing immediate execution without a prior decree 
when such an outlaw is caught red-handed. Insidious stealing and killing (at night or using 
poison), as well as arson, were regarded as exhibiting manifest criminality.
129
 Few acts, however, 
were considered as exhibiting manifest criminality; even robbery and diurnal murder were not 
considered as such.
130
  
Infractions that were not outlawry-deeming were considered wrongs inflicted strictly on the 
victims and their kin, who alone could seek justice--mostly through “blood feud,” which was the 
(bloody) equivalent of a civil suit.
131
 Although each side could harm any individual or property 
belonging to the other side, “rather than complete destruction of the enemy, the goal of the  feud 
was to get the other party to accept the challenger’s view of what was right thus restoring the 
peaceful state.”132 Hence, in contrast to the legal treatment of outlaws: (a) procedural regulations 
governed conduct in feuds; (b) the wrongdoing was regarded as unverified; and (c) only the 
victims and their kin were considered to have been (allegedly) wronged.
133
 
Germanic jurisprudence described a social obligation as “peace” and many “peaces” existed. 
“Personal” wrongs were regarded as breaches of the peace between the wrongdoers’ and the 
victims’ kin, whereas outlaws were enemies/disturbers of the peace of the entire community.134  
b. Roman Law 
In Roman jurisprudence, the three main categories of law were the laws of nature, laws of 
men, and customary laws. Some laws of men were regarded as universally applicable (jus 
gentium or “law of nations”), as were some laws of nature.135  
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Roman law also sanctioned extrajudicial execution of certain wrongdoers. For example, the 
Romans believed that the laws of nature require rulers to act for the benefit of their public’s good 
(commonwealth). The term “tyrant” was attached to a ruler who violated this duty, and Roman 
law deemed tyrants “enemies of mankind,” to be killed by anyone. In fact, the phrase hostis 
humani generis was first used in reference to tyrants, not pirates.
136
   
The extrajudicial execution of violators of certain laws of nations was also permitted. 
Notably, armed-forces operating within the boundaries of the Roman Empire that refused to 
submit to Roman rule--i.e., brigands and pirates--were deemed enemies of all nations, executable 
by anyone, for violating (according to the Romans) a law of nations that prohibited warring 
without legitimate authorization.
137
 Somewhat similar legal treatment applied to “barbarians,” 
external enemies considered “uncivilized” because they were beyond the pale of Roman 
influence.
138
  
Roman legislation also permitted the extrajudicial execution of “nocturnal” 
thieves/murderers and regular soldiers who attacked civilians or pillaged without authorization, 
by equating them to “latrones”, a term that became understood (by late-medieval times) as 
referring to both brigands and robbers.
139
 This permission had limits. If the person’s identity or 
wrongdoing were in doubt, certain summary proceedings had to be conducted before execution, 
and extrajudicial execution was prohibited when judicial recourse was available.
140
  
Roman law maintained two notions of treason, both of which allowed extrajudicial 
execution. The first referred to treason committed against the Roman people, whose perpetrators 
were “public enemies”. The second related to treason against the ruler (lèse-majesté).141  
Roman law did not treat all wrongdoers whose extrajudicial execution it allowed as 
regulated by a single doctrine.
142
 This began to change in the fourth century when Christianity 
became the Empire’s official religion, causing Christian and Roman jurisprudence to gradually 
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merge. Consequently (through a process that culminated only during the late Middle-Ages), the 
status of the Church’s internal and external enemies (heretics and infidels) became equated with 
that of the Empire’s enemies (pirates, brigands, rebels, traitors, and barbarians), and perpetrators 
of other acts considered grave crimes by Christian or Roman law (e.g., robbers). All these 
categories of wrongdoers were regarded equally as enemies of the Church, the Roman public, 
and even mankind (to be killed by anyone).
143
  
Despite some similarities between Roman-Christian and Germanic extrajudicial execution 
doctrines, there were considerable differences. Notably, whereas Germanic law relied heavily on 
self-enforcement, Roman-Christian jurisprudence considered it an exception.
144
 Formally, 
Roman-Christian jurisprudence, generally regarded harming even enemies and criminals as a 
grave crime and permitted doing so only when it was aimed at enforcing justice. Furthermore, 
the enforcement of justice (namely, both war-making and the punishment of criminals) was the 
prerogative of rulers (originally, Roman Emperors), because they were divinely chosen. Others 
were primarily permitted to kill criminals and enemies under the direction of a ruler or God. 
Gradually, the extrajudicial killings of criminals without such directions became permissible 
only when recourse to the ruler’s courts was unavailable.145 
c. The Medieval Jurisprudential Revolution  
At the turn of the first millennium, different authorities competed to fill the power void 
created by the decline of the Carolingian Empire.
146
 Despite Europe’s institutional 
fragmentation, medieval jurisprudence adhered to a broad transnational concept of “public good” 
rooted in Roman law, redefining the “Roman public” to include “all who obeyed the mother 
church.”147 This public was referred to as republica Christiana and even as 
“humanity”/“mankind”.148 In quest for dominance, the Church revived the Roman-Christian 
doctrines that centuries earlier centralized war-making and criminal justice authorities in the 
hands of divinely-chosen rulers--claiming dominance over all Christian rulers by asserting that 
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the Pope inherited the Roman Emperors’ supreme authority to enforce justice and protect the 
commonwealth of Christendom/humanity.
149
  
Papal dominance was also propounded based on Germanic jurisprudence, mainly based on 
the tenets of the Peace of God movement, which held that infringement of certain norms violated 
a universal peace that supersedes all localized peaces.
150
 Such violations authorized the Church 
to decree the religious version of outlawry: excommunication.
151
  
Use of both Germanic and Roman-Christian doctrines caused these bodies of law to 
gradually merge.
152
 Evidence of this conflation is found in the various terms, some Roman-
Christian in origin and others Germanic, that became synonymous with “outlaw,” including  
“enemy of peace,” “disturber of peace,” “enemy of mankind,” “common criminal,” “banned,” 
“exiled,” “banished” and “public enemy.”153  
Several European rulers who, for historical reasons (e.g. being Charlemagne’s descendants), 
had competing claims to the title of Emperor--notably, the head of the entity known as the “Holy 
Roman Empire”--also advanced transnational jurisprudential positions similar to that taken by 
Popes. But, each claimed that he--not the Pope (or anyone else)--was the true heir of Roman 
imperial authority.
154
 
The rise of modern States was a slow process that began in the late Middle-Ages, when 
European Kings gradually centralized lawmaking and judicial powers in royal hands by 
subordinating local lords and judicial systems, and freeing themselves from subordination to 
Popes and “Emperors”.155 Ironically, these Kings, originally, made their bid for power and 
autonomy based on the same doctrines as the Church, simply interpreting them differently: (a) 
they declared that “every king is an emperor within his kingdom” and (b) reconstructed the 
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Germanic communal peace notion into the “King’s peace” doctrine.156 Moreover, the 
jurisprudence (originally advanced by the Church) that merged Roman-Christian and Germanic 
law, by equating disturbances of the “Peace of God” with threats to the “Roman” (Christian) 
“public good”, enabled Kings to apply Roman doctrines restricting extrajudicial executions so as 
to limit the Germanic authorization of self-enforcement against outlaws and assert their courts’ 
exclusive authority to punish breaches of their subjects’ communal “peace”/“public good”. This 
jurisprudence also enabled Kings to expand their courts’ substantive jurisdiction by adding to the 
acts considered communal wrongs those prohibited under Roman-Christian jurisprudence, even 
though not originally outlawry-deeming in Germanic law.
157
 The name given to the class of acts 
criminalized based on this “expanded” outlawry jurisprudence was felonies; the prototypical 
felonies were murder, robbery, theft, treason, arson, and rape.
158
  
Royal consolidation of judicial powers was incomplete in the late Middle-Ages. Three types 
of penal proceedings still existed: (a) general permission to extrajudicially execute the 
perpetrator was authorized in certain cases of manifest criminality or when the perpetrator had 
been decreed an outlaw; (b) semi-judicial, summary proceedings were conducted by local, non-
jurist officials for some felons; and (c) full-fledged judicial proceedings were conducted by the 
King’s judges for others.159 
A similar enforcement structure existed in the military justice system for violators of the 
laws of war (and other war-related international law): (a) enemy and compatriot soldiers caught 
red-handed were often punished extrajudicially; (b) most other cases were handled by “courts 
martial”/“military commissions” (semi-judicial, summary proceedings conducted by non-jurists); 
and (c) some cases were tried by full-fledged judicial tribunals with expert judges.
160
 
The correlation between that enforcement structure and the enforcement structure of 
medieval domestic penal enforcement is compelling evidence of the outlawry origins of ICL, 
given the accepted outlawry origins of domestic criminal law. One of the types of penal 
proceedings used (commonly) to enforce the laws of war, extrajudicial executions, is in itself 
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strongly indicative of the outlawry pedigree, given outlawry’s original implication (permission to 
extrajudicially execute perpetrators). Indeed, the connection between ICL and the medieval 
outlawry doctrine was still recognized in the early twentieth century.
161
 Only sometime after 
WWII was this connection completely forgotten, and past summary executions of war criminals 
inaccurately interpreted as acts of vengeance or reprisal, not the enforcement of criminal 
justice.
162
 Even if occasionally abused, a legal authority to summarily execute war criminals was 
invoked throughout the centuries. Furthermore, it was utilized against both enemy and 
compatriot soldiers, which supports the conclusion that it was not mere vengeance or reprisal.
163
  
In the context of domestic legal history, the outlawry doctrine’s normative power has also 
been questioned by claims that outlawry is not a juridical concept. Agamben argues that the 
outlawry-based prerogative to place a person beyond the pale of the law is still embedded in 
State sovereignty, in the mechanisms that grant the State control over individuals’ lives. 
Agamben claims that acknowledging that persistent embedding reveals the falsehood of the 
belief that the law can constrain those in power.
164
 Butler agrees with Agamben regarding the 
inaptitude of law, but criticizes him for making overly general claims about the persistent use of 
outlawry by those in power, which “do not yet tell us how this power functions differently” in 
different times and contexts.
165
  
If Agamben’s position is applicable to ICL, we must conclude that ICL’s outlawry doctrine 
has always been a mere disguise for oppression. If Butler’s position is true, a genealogical 
account of that doctrine is uninteresting. But, as many have noted, Agamben’s and Butler’s 
positions are based on inaccurate understanding of the law.
166
 Laws can constrain the use of 
power.
167
  
It should be noted that a common response to claims that outlawry was not a juridical 
concept underestimates outlawry’s contribution to criminal law. In most Western domestic legal 
systems, over time, outlawry drastically changed and subsequently faded. This is especially true 
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for outlawry decreeing, after that authority passed from royal to judicial hands. Therefore, it has 
been argued that, with the exception of the name, the original outlawry and the later, judicial 
outlawry are patently distinct, and whereas the former was not a juridical concept the latter 
was,
168
 which means that the elements of discontinuity overshadow those of continuity.
169
 
But, the claim that the original outlawry doctrine was not a juridical concept is actually an 
expression of the flawed “Modern State Conception,” which disregards the means used by 
criminal justice systems that lack centralized law-enforcement organs. Also, in most domestic 
systems, outlawry changed gradually, making rupture claims inaccurate.
170
  More importantly, 
this reasoning fails to acknowledge outlawry’s full influence on domestic criminal law. As noted, 
the original basis for the penalization of felonies was their perception as grave wrongs, whose 
perpetrators were outlaws. That legal perception had various long-lasting effects (one of them is 
discussed in the next section).  
The elements of continuity in ICL regarding outlawry are even greater. Unlike its (generally 
speaking) long-abolished domestic counterpart,
171
 the outlawry-based authority to extrajudicially 
execute war criminals remained part of the law until 1949.
172
 Moreover, even today, considering 
wrongdoers enemies of mankind constitutes the conceptual basis for universal jurisdiction.
173
  
d. Military Justice as a Transnational System  
We intuitively assume that States and their laws (criminal and otherwise) came first, 
followed by international law that was developed by the States as a means of coordinating their 
interactions and moreover, ICL was created only very recently. Yet this description is inaccurate.  
Kings originally relied on the same transnational doctrines as did Popes and “Emperors” and 
although a localized notion of public/peace began to emerge already during medieval times, the 
process that detached it from its transnational origins was extremely drawn-out.
174
 As late as the 
nineteenth century, in most European domestic criminal justice systems the prevailing 
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jurisprudential basis for the criminalization of many felonies classified today as domestic (e.g., 
murder, robbery, arson, theft, and rape) continued to be perceived as infringement of universal 
natural law. “[C]ase law and especially doctrine [had thus remained] of an international 
character.”175 Such felonies were deemed “crime[s]… contra jus gentium… against the law of 
nations”,176 and their perpetrators “enemies of mankind.”177 Many but not all European judicial 
systems even applied the universal jurisdiction doctrine to such felonies.
178
 Moreover, in judicial 
systems that did not apply that doctrine (e.g., English Common law) the perception of such 
felonies as violations of universal law also remained. Their courts were simply perceived as 
having jurisdiction only when the universal natural law was violated in a manner that breached 
the relevant King’s “peace”.179  
Domestic crimes--namely, acts considered crimes only in a specific kingdom--existed 
alongside universal crimes.
180
 The distinction between the two was not always clear, as certain 
domestic crimes came into existence through a local interpretation of a universal crime.
181
  
Only in the nineteenth century, under the influence of positivism, support for the application 
of universal jurisdiction to felonies diminished considerably.
182
 In some countries it transformed 
into the judex loci deprehensionis doctrine, which permits the prosecution of certain foreign-
domestic criminals.
183
  
Currently, many jurists characterize pre-WWII cases of war crime prosecution as purely 
domestic legal measures, and therefore not ICL precedent, because they were adjudicated by the 
military tribunals of various European powers and not by transnational tribunals.
184
 This position 
is mistaken because, as explained, in the past “there was no sharp distinction between 
international and national law”.185  
This position is further mistaken because until the nineteenth century military and civilian 
justice systems were not branches of a single (domestic) system, and military justice had 
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considerable transnational attributes. In medieval times, knightly issues, including the laws of 
war, were outside the jurisdiction of royal civilian courts and were adjudicated by a separate 
judicial system. Other guild-oriented transnational judicial system also existed.
186
 Members of 
the knightly guild considered themselves defenders of all “Romans” (Christians),187 and “[t]he 
law of arms was [regarded as an] extension of the natural law and the law of nations.”188 When it 
came to enforcing such laws, all medieval military judicial forums regarded themselves as 
belonging to a single transnational network aimed at regulating a given social sphere (war), 
monopolized by a specific transnational guild (knights). Thus, the same law was “applied and 
enforced by all military tribunals in Christendom, whether of the enemy prince or of the prince 
upon whom a knight or man-at-arms depended.”189 That transnational soldierly ethos persisted 
far beyond the Middle-Ages.
190
 Therefore, legal doctrines adjudicated in military forums were 
even less susceptible to “domestication” pressures than those adjudicated in civilian courts.191  
Because the same transnational doctrines were applied in military forums of various armies, 
individuals were often tried for infringing norms not enshrined in any formal domestic 
legislation.
192
 The current understanding of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, after all, 
was adopted by domestic law only in the nineteenth century as part of a positivism-driven 
codification trend that swept across Europe.
193
 ICL, which was not influenced as much as 
domestic penal law by nineteenth century positivism, never fully accepted this principle.
194
  
Admittedly, the codification trend did have some influence on ICL, contributing to the treaty 
codification of the laws of war. Some contemporary jurists even posit that the “rules of war 
became laws of war” only following that treaty codification, as gradually, penalties were 
explicitly assigned in such treaties to violations of codified norms.
195
 But this is inaccurate. In 
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the past, the terms “rules of war” and “laws of war” were often used interchangeably.196 
Moreover, these norms were not mere professional rules of ethics before their codification, just 
as the prohibitions against rape and theft are not merely ethical recommendations in 
contemporary Scotland because they are unlegislated crimes. As discussed, most laws of war 
were considerably enforced against both enemy and compatriot soldiers (with the maximum 
penalty being death). The misleading depiction of the uncodified laws of war as ineffective can 
be traced back to attempts by some nineteenth-century positivists to undermine these laws.
197
  
Military tribunals always had a mixed domestic-transnational function. Their chief 
“municipal” role was to enforce norms currently considered domestic military law (e.g., 
disobeying an order). These norms were often enshrined in positive military legislation known as 
“Articles of War,” which also included provisions forbidding compatriot soldiers from 
committing certain acts barred under the laws of war.
198
 But even such positive war crime 
prohibitions should not be viewed as entirely domestic legal norms. First, until the nineteenth 
century, European military penal codes were usually not acts of parliament, but rather executive 
decrees issued by Kings or military commanders based on an inherent prerogative. That 
prerogative was originally anchored in the convention that Kings and commanders were not only 
domestic agents but also high-ranking members of the transnational guild of warriors--duty-
bound, as such, to enforce international law and maintain their forces’ discipline.199 Second, pre-
nineteenth-century European jurisprudence commonly viewed unwritten natural law as 
obligatory. Domestic legislations were generally expected to reflect that law and they were often 
considered written clarifications of it.
200
 Third, for centuries, even when a certain war crime was 
not explicitly noted in the Articles of War, soldiers could still be punished for violating the 
unlegislated, transnational laws of war.
201
 As the 1643 Scottish Articles of War stated, 
“[m]atters, that are clear by the light and law of nature, are presupposed… other things may be 
judged by the common customs and constitutions of war; or may, upon new emergents, be 
expressed afterward.”202 
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During the nineteenth century, many European States began to rely on conscription-based 
national armies, which weakened combatants’ commitment to the transnational soldierly 
ethos.
203
 Legislative reforms further increased military courts’ subordination to domestic/civilian 
legislative and judicial bodies.
204
 But even through this period, ICL considerably resisted 
domestication pressures.
205
  
The gradual rise of modern States and the transnational nature of military justice are 
illustrated below in two contexts: the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms, and England. 
e. When Did the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms Become States?  
Until recently, the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War, was 
commonly viewed as the inception of the modern State, mainly because as a result of it the 
princedoms of the Holy Roman Empire--the predecessors of most European States--attained 
autonomy over the key functions associated with sovereignty: law-, war-, and peace-making.
206
 
International law’s birth presumably followed: “The idea of authority or organization above the 
states [was] no longer [and the] new system reste[d] on international law… operating between, 
rather than above states.”207 Note that this narrative undermines international law by depicting it 
as a more recent creation than States which does not supersede State authority and was only 
created by the States to aid in coordinating their interactions.  
This Westphalian narrative has been refuted in recent decades.
208
 The rise of modern 
States in Europe was a gradual process that began in the late Middle-Ages and peaked only 
during the nineteenth century. The lengthiness of this process is evident in the context of the 
Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms. Although these princedoms were considerably autonomous 
already centuries before 1648, the Peace of Westphalia significantly constrained their 
sovereignty, imposing restrictions that remained in force until the Empire’s abolishment in 1806. 
According to these restrictions, in exercising their law-, war-, and peace-making powers, the 
princedoms were prohibited from infringing various transnational legal norms, including certain 
unwritten norms considered universal natural law.
209
 Two imperial tribunals, the Imperial 
Chamber Court and the Aulic Council, were further authorized to void laws, domestic court 
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decisions, treaties signed by princedoms, and other government actions of the princedoms if they 
violated these transnational norms.
210
 As the princedoms gained sovereign powers, the Empire’s 
“structure transformed… into a relationship of international law”,211 which gradually 
transformed these tribunals into “international court[s]”.212 Thus, contrary to the “Westphalian 
Myth”, even after 1648, and until the nineteenth century, both transnational organs and 
international law remained above these emerging States.  
As exposed in recent decades, the Westphalian Myth was created in the nineteenth century 
and there is considerable convergence between central catalysts of it and some catalysts of 
modern positivism. First, a jurisprudential turn to the social sciences contributed to the rise of 
both. Gradually, the claim of secular natural law jurisprudence to rationalize jurisprudential 
thinking by drawing analogies from the natural sciences and logical reasoning lost its appeal. 
Instead, much of jurisprudential thinking turned to attempting to draw analogies from the social 
sciences. Positivism was amongst the most prominent of these attempts.
213
 Also as part of this 
transition, many turned to “what amounted to some kind of historical sociology”, which gave rise 
to the Westphalian Myth.
214
 Second, both legal positivism and the Westphalian Myth did not 
merely reflect the culmination of modern States’ rise; these views were considerably advanced 
by those attempting to strengthen State sovereignty.
215
 Positivists, accordingly, were among 
those that strongly contributed to the propagation of the Westphalian Myth. While positivist 
conceptualizations of States and of international law were “doctrinally consolidated [only] in the 
final decades of the nineteenth century”,216 soon thereafter, with the aid of the Westphalian 
Myth, such conceptualizations were “projected back as the screen memory over an otherwise 
forgotten past.”217 The Westphalian Myth was especially advanced by positivist opponents of 
international law. Some such opponents eventually broke off from international jurists to create a 
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new discipline: International Relations.
218
 That discipline was premised, originally, on the belief 
that power and politics, not law, regulate behavior at the international level. It was also premised 
on the Westphalian Myth, holding that a world order consisting of fully autonomous States is a 
longstanding social contract.
219
 
International law is, sometimes, said to have been born not subsequent to the Westphalian 
inception of Sates, but as a result of Hugo Grotius’s jurisprudence, written during the Thirty 
Years’ War.  This is false. Continuity exists between Grotius’s work and earlier jurisprudence.220 
This narrative also has its origin in the nineteenth century, as a person-oriented version of the 
Westphalian Myth.
221
    
f. England 
The English Kings were among the first rulers to free themselves from papal and imperial 
rule. Furthermore, already around the twelfth century, England started developing a distinct 
domestic legal system: the Common Law.
222
 But, for many centuries the Common Law was not 
the only legal system in England, and it vied for jurisdiction and predominance with other 
systems such as the military, admiralty, and equity systems. Unlike Common Law courts, most 
competing judicial systems adjudicated cases mainly based on the norms considered universal, 
natural law across Europe.
223
  
 Because prohibitions in military and civilian European legal systems shared their 
jurisprudential origin, it was common to find two different crimes--transnational (adjudicated in 
military courts, English military courts included) versus domestic (adjudicated in civilian courts, 
such as the Common Law courts)--bearing the same name.
224
 For example, as demonstrated 
below, two different crimes of treason existed.  
Today treason is considered the archetypical domestic crime, which should never fall under 
the jurisdiction of ICL.
225
 In the late Middle-Ages and later, however, because Christian Kings 
were believed to be divinely-anointed, “rebellion [was] a breach of the faith that held Christian 
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society together [and rebels were, accordingly, viewed as having] placed themselves beyond the 
pale of peaceful Christian society and were now no more than brigands and thieves.”226 Put 
differently, treason was an international crime and traitors/rebels international outlaws.  
Although Kings benefited from this transnational doctrine, they preferred to vest much of 
the authority to adjudicate treason against them in their civilian (domestic) courts. Consequently, 
for centuries, the military and civilian systems had parallel authority to try combat-related 
treason.
227
 Gradually, the (transnational) military and (domestic) civilian crimes of treason 
became distinct, as illustrated by the case of Perkin Warbeck (1499). Warbeck, a Fleming, 
invaded England, laying claim to the English throne by pretending to be the son of Edward IV. 
After failing, he was prosecuted for treason in a Common Law court, which ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction because enemy aliens acting in the course of war were not bound to uphold the 
King’s peace. Warbeck was then retried by a military tribunal, which convicted him of treason 
(by many accounts) and sentenced him to death. The military tribunal’s jurisdiction and ruling 
was, most likely, based on a contemporaneous law of war that deemed usurpation to be a 
tyrannical, traitorous act.
228
 Other medieval cases reveal that, unlike domestic courts, military 
tribunals prosecuted even foreigners for certain wartime acts of betrayal of allegiance (treason) 
owed to their (foreign) King.
229
 Thus, the jurisprudence of military justice diverged considerably 
from domestic jurisprudence. 
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Perkin Warbeck
230
 
 
According to eighteenth-century historian John Barrow, when Warbeck was (prior to his 
capture) under Archduke Philip’s protection, the English King sent ambassadors to the 
Archduke “and demanded that Perkin might be delivered into their hands as a pirate, or 
common enemy to mankind, who ought not be protected by the law of nations.”231 
The military and other legal systems continued to exist in England long after the Middle-
Ages. Only in the seventeenth century did Common Law jurists effectively try to abolish the 
competing systems, with partial success.
232
 Many systems, including the military system, 
however, survived. They remained relatively autonomous well into the nineteenth century, when, 
owing to a cultural trend that led to the eventual merger of Common Law and Equity, Common 
Law doctrines began to enjoy broad application in the courts of the other systems.
233
   
Reliance on the unwritten laws of war for trying both compatriot and captured enemy 
soldiers continued even later, and regarding the latter it remained the main legal basis for 
prosecutions of war crimes even after WWII.
 
These unlegislated norms and the military tribunals 
that apply them still regulate some war crimes cases in England regarding both kinds of 
soldiers,
234
 and, even today, these military tribunals stand “wholly outside the [English] civilian 
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court system, in the same way that the regular courts-martial… stand outside it; and the law they 
appl[y] [is] not English law but… the customary international laws of war, as a sui generis 
applicable law.”235 
In sum, as both the cases of England and the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms 
demonstrate, it is a mistake to assume that States predated or created international law. State 
sovereignty is the result of a protracted process that has peaked only in recent times. 
Additionally, the military and civilian justice systems have distinct institutional and normative 
histories, and throughout the centuries, reliance on transnational jurisprudence persisted more 
strongly in the military justice forums. For these reasons, pre-WWII war crime prosecution cases 
should rightfully be regarded as precedents of ICL.   
5. The Outlawry Basis of ICL 
a. Medieval ICL  
Medieval jus ad bellum divided armed-conflicts into several categories that mirrored those 
of contemporaneous criminal law. The two primary categories were feud-like wars and wars 
intended to punish enemies deemed international outlaws by jus ad bellum.
236
  
The law applicable in wars waged against outlawed enemies conceptually mimicked the 
municipal process of punishing outlaws: the unjust nature of the enemies’ actions was 
predetermined, and because the wrong was against universal peace (the commonwealth of 
Christendom/mankind/humanity) all were duty-bound to join in the war and punish the 
international outlaws. “Total War” could be waged against outlawed enemies (no jus in bello 
restrictions applied). Therefore, all captured enemy combatants--not only war criminals--could 
be executed.
237
  
Influenced by Roman-Christian jurisprudence, medieval jus ad bellum considered the 
following belligerents to be outlawed enemies: pirates, brigands, rebels, traitors, tyrants, 
barbarians/savages, infidels, and heretics.
238
 Otherwise-legitimate belligerents (Christian rulers) 
fighting without just cause were also outlawed enemies.
239
 Based on the last category, 
contemporary jurists presume that each side generally declared the other to lack just cause, so 
that all medieval wars were fought without jus in bello restrictions and therefore cases in which 
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individuals were held personally responsible for violating jus in bello (i.e., war crime 
prosecutions) were rare.
240
 Many historians, however, consider this an exaggeration, because 
“war to the death [between Christian rulers] was uncommon.”241   
Wars between Christian rulers were mostly limited conflicts, equivalent to large-scale blood 
feuds. Similarly to feuds, (a) opponents were considered the enemies of only a given community; 
(b) the identity of the wrongdoer was to be determined by the war; and (c) in bello conduct was 
subject to legal restrictions (including a duty to grant POW status to captured enemy knights).
242
 
As demonstrated below, otherwise-legitimate combatants who violated jus in bello in feud-like 
wars were individually considered international outlaws.  
The shaping of medieval ICL was influenced by the aforementioned Roman-Christian 
doctrine which permitted harming even enemies and criminals only for the enforcement of 
justice, and granted rulers the primary justice enforcement authority. Based on this doctrine, acts 
generally considered outlawry-deeming, such as harming lives or property, were considered legal 
when committed by rulers or combatants acting under their authority during feud-like wars.
243
 
But because the wartime legality of such acts depended on royal authorization, committing them 
without such license remained outlawry-deeming; as Jamieson explains:
244
  
serious persistent crimes could result in an individual being branded as an outlaw. 
Offences of murder… arson and theft were regarded as heinous crimes which would put 
a person beyond the laws of society [However,] soldiers were given, in effect, a license 
to commit them… provided they fought with the sanctions of an appropriate authority. 
Problems arose when that authority was absent and soldiers were seen to be fighting 
illegitimately for their own interests. In such a situation… [t]hey could find themselves 
treated as outlaws, against whom lethal force could be legitimately used by those in 
authority. 
War criminals were often referred to as “robbers,” “murderers,” “arsonists” etcetera.245 
These were not references to domestic crimes, as evident by the fact that the combatants who 
committed them were “regarded as criminals… who were beyond the normal laws of God and 
men” (i.e., as international outlaws for violating international law).246 These references were, 
most likely, a way to convey these combatants’ international outlaw status, alternate to referring 
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to them as “outlaws”. After all, the prohibitions against harming property and lives (felonies such 
as arson, robbery, murder) were outlawry-deeming natural laws to which the permission given to 
combatants to take lives and property by royal authorization was a legal exception.  
The view of regular combatants who violated the laws of war as international outlaws is also 
evident in the practice of equating such war criminals with pirates and brigands. Sohmer-Tai 
uncovered hundreds of cases that were adjudicated in various courts around the Mediterranean 
between approximately 1200 and 1410, in which soldiers of conventional navy forces were 
accused “of robbing… in modo piratico (in a piratical fashion or manner) despite conditions of… 
pre-existing treaty, or alliance.”247 Similarly, Rowe reported that in 1431, during a war in France, 
a captured (otherwise-legitimate) enemy combatant was executed for violating the laws of war, 
and his captor was paid “as though he had caught a brigand”.248  
The prohibition against deceitful taking of life/property (originating from both Germanic 
and Roman-Christian law) was also adapted to feud-like wars, serving as the basis for various in 
bello laws. The main wartime acts criminalized under this prohibition were breaches of 
obligations toward an enemy, including violations of truce/peace agreements, terms of surrender, 
and POW parole conditions.
249
  
Although medieval sources are secondary and brief, they nonetheless contain reports 
explicitly referring to perpetrators of such acts as outlaws. A twelfth century chronicle of a case 
from 1098 describes how enemy knights captured as POWs by King Rufus of England were 
granted, upon their request, parole every evening. In response to his courtiers’ concerns that the 
prisoners might escape, Rufus answered: “Far be it from me to think that a brave knight will 
forfeit his word! If he did so, he would become a contemptible outlaw all his life.”250  
Cases related to the assassination, in 1419, of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, also 
prove that perfidious violations of the laws of war were outlawry-deeming. During Charles VI’s 
reign in France, a baron war erupted between his son (the Dauphin) and John the Fearless. The 
Dauphin requested a meeting with John to negotiate a truce, but at the meeting he and his men 
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assassinated John, violating safe-conduct assurances he had given John.
251
 This assassination (an 
act considered a war crime to this day
252
) was explicitly described at the time as an act 
“against… the law of nations” (“contra… jus gentium”),253 and its perpetrators were declared 
“disturbers of the peace” (“les infracteurs de la paix”) and “enemies of the peace” (“des ennemis 
de la paix”).254 Charles even disowned his son and signed a treaty with Henry V, King of 
England (a supporter of the Duke of Burgundy), whereby the French throne would pass to Henry 
after his death.
255
 Although the Dauphin escaped further punishment, many of his accessories 
were sentenced to death, some by a French military tribunal and others by King Henry.
256
 
Because the crime was committed before Henry’s active involvement in the war and because 
Henry punished perpetrators when Charles ruled France, these cases can be seen as early 
instances of reliance on universal jurisdiction in prosecuting war crimes.
257
 
The Assassination of John the Fearless
258
 
 
Similarly to how a Latin chronicle referred to the act as “contra fidem & jus 
gentium”(“against the faith and the law of nations”), an English chronicler called it a 
murder in violation of a promise and “against both God’s lawes and man’s lawes.”259 
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Occasionally, perfidious violations of the laws of war were referred to as treason.
260
 That is 
because the international crime of treason was much broader than its contemporary domestic 
successor: in addition to betrayal of one’s sovereign, violations of many other obligations and 
acts of deceitful taking of life or property were also considered treason. All these forms of 
treason were regarded as outlawry-deeming violations of universal, natural law.
261
 Hence, such 
treason references were probably intended to convey the perpetrators’ outlaw status. Some of 
these acts are still described as “treacherous” in modern ICL.262  
Attempts were also made to incorporate non-combatant protections into medieval jus in 
bello. Although not all non-combatants were legally protected, pillage, rape, and harming of 
women, children, the elderly, priests, churches, and members of several professions were 
considered violations of universal, natural law.
263
 We find reliance on the international outlawry 
doctrine to this end in the “Truce of God” decreed by Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, in 1085. 
In addition to placing those fighting during certain religious dates under a ban as “violators of the 
holy peace” (deeming them outlaws), Henry decreed that: “Merchants… rustics… other similar 
occupations… [w]omen… and all those ordained to sacred orders, shall enjoy continual peace” 
(namely, harming them was always outlawry-deeming).
264
 
Similarly, Canon 27 of the Third Lateran Council (1179), excommunicated (outlawed) 
members of six mercenary forces because they: “practice[d] such cruelty upon Christians that 
they respect[ed] neither churches nor monasteries, and spare[d] neither widows, orphans, old or 
young nor any age or sex.”265 These mercenaries were internationally outlawed, as the Canon 
called “on all the faithful [to] oppose [them] with all their might and by arms protect the 
Christian people against them.”266 
Some claim that these medieval non-combatant protections were not enforced because 
knights, who generally practiced and enforced the laws of war, cared only about themselves.
267
 
This is an exaggeration.
268
 A knight could be stripped of his honors (chivalry’s unique 
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expression of outlawry) for the “sacking of churches… rape [or] arson”, because these were 
“breaches of the knightly faith”.269 As the cases of Conradin and von-Hagenbach demonstrate, 
even some high-ranking knights were actually punished by their adversaries for violating non-
combatant protections. Some lower-ranking knights are known to have been punished even by 
their own side for violating these prohibitions.
270
 Furthermore, certain non-combatant protections 
were more adhered to than others; particularly, the law protecting priests
271
 and women.
272
 Non-
combatant legal protections were even more strictly enforced against non-knightly soldiers.
273
  
The “tyranny” doctrine was also used to protect civilians. In Roman law, sovereigns who 
violated their duty to act for the “public good” were deemed tyrants. Because all Christians were 
regarded as belonging to the Roman public, in the late Middle-Ages and centuries thereafter a 
ruler could be deemed a tyrant for acting against the commonwealth of his subjects or of foreign 
Christians.
274
 Four main subcategories of tyrants existed: (a) rulers who committed atrocities 
against their subjects; (b) rulers who conducted aggressive wars, in which extensive atrocities 
were committed against Christians; (c) rulers who systematically failed to punish their subjects 
who committed atrocities against compatriot or foreign Christians; and (d) individuals who 
usurped a throne (because God determines such entitlements).
275
  
The tyranny doctrine was originally an ad bellum law, allowing total war to be waged 
against all those on the tyrant’s side.276 But, despite the original permission to kill not only the 
tyrant, this doctrine is strongly related to ICL history. Since medieval thought shifted with great 
ease from individual culpability to collective responsibility and vice versa, the tyranny doctrine 
regulated not only interactions between collective entities, but was also a penal norm that treated 
the relevant individual ruler and his close associates as international outlaws.  This is 
demonstrated by the prosecution of von-Hagenbach for tyranny and of King Conradin, along 
with a few of his men, for usurpation (a subcategory of tyranny). Gradually, the doctrine’s ICL 
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element became increasingly pronounced: the masses were no longer executed and only culpable 
high-ranking individuals, including rulers, were prosecuted for tyranny.
277
  
Since tyranny authorized deposing the ruler, when a King was accused of tyranny, the 
accusation was usually made by those wishing to depose him.
278
 Tyranny was also commonly 
used by rulers to justify intervention in foreign conflicts.
279
 These two politically motivated 
applications are neither surprising (as tyranny was an ad bellum law), nor should they lead us to 
disregard the tyranny doctrine (because even ad bellum laws often have normative force).
280
  
Especially noteworthy is the application of tyranny in the context of baron wars. Kings held 
that only rulers not subservient to other rulers were authorized to wage war, but local lords 
claimed to have autonomous authority to make war. During much of late-medieval times, a legal 
compromise was reached that permitted baron wars, but with uniquely restrictive jus in bello. 
Notably, causing extensive harm to non-combatants was a war crime in such wars.
281
 Local lords 
who violated that jus in bello were considered tyrants (and murderers, outlaws, etc.).  
The case of Thomas of Marle (1111-14), which occurred during King Louis VI’s reign in 
France, demonstrates this issue. The chronicler Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis (1081-1151) accused 
Thomas of “ferocious tyranny” for unjustly warring with neighboring lords.282 After King Louis 
intervened, Thomas promised to cease fighting but reneged on his promise and committed acts of 
massacre, rapine, and arson, “not [even] spar[ing] the clergy out of fear of excommunication nor 
the people out of any humanity.”283 In response, Church leaders condemned him as an “enem[y] 
of Christ’s true bride,” and “struck at Thomas’s tyranny [by] strip[ping] him of all honours as an 
infamous criminal, enemy to the name of Christian.”284 The King then285  
gathered an army against Thomas [and] turned towards… castle of Crécy … seized [it and] 
confounded the criminals; piously massacred the impious and mercilessly beheaded those 
who had showed no mercy… the king then set out against [the] wicked castle [of 
Nouvions] in pardoning the innocent and severely punishing the guilty… Thirsting for 
justice, he condemned all the detestable murderers he found to be hanged [and] abolished 
in perpetuity the lordship of that infamous Thomas and his heirs over that city. 
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The Execution of Thomas of Marle
286
 
 
The transition from medieval to Early Modern Times is marked by royal triumph in the 
debate concerning the illegality of baron wars. Participants in such wars were henceforth 
considered rebels/traitors/brigands.
287
 At about the same time, various prohibitions that first 
applied only to baron wars became applicable to wars between sovereigns.
288
    
b. Early Modern Times (Approximately 1500-1799) 
When contemporary jurists outline ICL history, cases from Early Modern Times of penal 
enforcement of the laws of war are hardly ever acknowledged (unlike medieval and nineteenth-
century cases, of which, at least a few are mentioned and only then dismissed as unrelated to 
contemporary ICL).
289
 But historians uncovered many such cases from Early Modern Times.
290
 
The discrepancy is caused by two misconceptions.   
First, many sixteenth and seventeenth century wars were either conflicts between Catholics 
and Protestants (who considered each other heretics) or rebellions, and jus ad bellum still 
permitted waging total war against heretics and rebels. Therefore, jurists assume that wartime 
conduct was not legally regulated. The most horrific of these conflicts was the Thirty Years’ War 
(1618-1648). Its trauma is credited for motivating Grotius (and subsequent jurists) to develop 
doctrines mandating belligerents to abide by jus in bello regardless of their views about their 
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opponent’s cause. Thus, jus in bello is considered to be predominantly a post-1648 
development.
291
 
Second, in the second half of Early Modern Times, most conflicts were interstate wars in 
which a total war policy was generally prohibited. Still, jurists do not consider war crime 
prosecution cases from these wars as precedents of ICL, but purely domestic measures--each 
taken by the State whose military tribunal adjudicated it--because there is “difficulty in 
grounding an international criminal law in a decentralized legal order.”292   
This account is incorrect. Indeed, many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century conflicts were 
religious wars and rebellions in which, during the initial period of conflict, at least one side 
adopted a total war approach, usually reciprocated by the adversary. Counter-intuitively, 
however, the adversary’s total war reprisal often did not precipitate the war into unrestrained 
bloodshed. The harm suffered by the first side from such reprisal often caused it to renounce its 
total war approach, and both sides would agree to conduct themselves as-if they considered the 
other side a legitimate belligerent. This meant that the sides obligated themselves to adhere to jus 
in bello, to punish violators of these laws, and to accord POW status to captured enemy soldiers 
who had not committed such violations. Although many wartime atrocities went unpunished 
during these times, there was far more ICL enforcement than the no-enforcement jurists 
assume.
293
  
Depiction of late-seventeenth and eighteenth century cases of war crime prosecution as 
merely domestic measures is also inaccurate. First, as explained, the conclusion that a legal 
system did not exist only because it relied on a decentralized enforcement mechanism is based 
on an overly-narrow and historically incomplete conception of legal systems. Second, the various 
European military judicial forums continued to regard themselves as part of a single 
transnational network, obligated to uphold the international laws of war.
294
 Third, during this 
period pirates were also punished mainly by the military tribunals of European forces, and still, 
jurists acknowledge that piracy was already an international crime at the time because of the 
application of a similar transnational doctrine in all piracy cases. The same reasoning should 
apply also to war crime prosecutions.   
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Based on the aforementioned misconceptions, the narrative of the history of the laws of war 
prevalent among contemporary jurists is that: (a) before the second half of Early Modern Times 
there was no effective international law regulating wartime conduct and (b) although such a body 
of law did subsequently exist, it addressed only States and not individuals until the end of 
WWII.
295
 This account is simply the application of the Westphalian Myth to the laws of war. 
Historians, by contrast, have shown that the laws of war existed throughout the period, and 
although they were occasionally violated, “legal sanctions [often] ensued” in the form of “trial 
and punishment by special military tribunals” (scilicet, ICL also existed).296 Thus, current ICL 
proponents unknowingly support an inaccurate narrative, originally commonly propagated to 
delegitimize international law, although a more accurate account serves their cause better.  
Jurists’ historical account of public international law in general also divides Early Modern 
Times in half, although, the declared guiding rationale here usually has to do with jurisprudential 
shifts. First, the transition from the Middle-Ages to Early Modern Times is said to be marked by 
the triumph of the “Divine Right of Kings” jurisprudence, which proclaimed Kings to be 
superior princes, unsubordinated to anyone, who alone have authority to make war and punish 
criminals. A second transition allegedly began with Grotius’s jurisprudence. That transition 
gradually changed the presumed foundation of the duty to abide by international law, from a 
belief in its divineness to a secular belief that natural law can be deduced through logical 
reasoning. This secular perspective induced the premise that certain natural laws, including core 
human rights, existed even in a “state of nature,” before the formation of a social-contract-based 
society. Because belligerents are in a state of nature in relation to one another, they must abide 
by these natural laws.
297
 
This is, however, an oversimplified account. First, early social-contract jurisprudence 
existed, and was influential, already in the sixteenth century,
298
 and divine-right jurisprudence 
still had support in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century.
299
 Second, each of these two 
schools included scholars both dismissive and supportive of international law.
300
 Third, many 
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more schools existed throughout Early Modern Times, a plurality resulting from the 
Reformation, which shattered earlier jurisprudential consensus.
301
  
The lack of consensus further caused jurisprudential writings to lose much of their authority. 
Although they still exercised some influence (divine-right jurisprudence aided Kings to triumph 
in the struggle over sovereign power and social-contract jurisprudence contributed to 
international law’s secularization), customary law and practices were more important legal 
sources. As a result, actual international law exhibited greater continuity than is conveyed by 
early-modern jurisprudential works.
302
 Accordingly, although armies, wars, and jurisprudence 
experienced considerable changes during these centuries, the laws of war and their penal 
enforcement “displayed a remarkable continuity [due to, among other reasons] the weight [of] 
practice and precedent”.303 Therefore, the current tendency in jurists’ historical accounts to 
divide Early Modern Times is inaccurate and is probably a lingering effect of the Westphalian 
Myth. The remainder of this part examines cases from various early-modern wars, to 
demonstrate that despite considerable jurisprudential and societal changes, ICL continued to be 
enforced and its doctrinal reliance on the international outlawry doctrine persisted.  
1)  The French Wars of Religion (1562-1598)  
  In addition to the period’s religious wars, jurists also consider the “end of chivalry” as a 
cause for discontinuity between medieval and early-modern laws of war, because the community 
to which the laws of war applied changed to mercenaries that presumably disregard these 
laws.
304
 The French Wars of Religion were civil wars between Catholics and Protestants in 
which all sides relied on mercenaries. Therefore, had the Reformation or the end of chivalry 
caused a discontinuity in the laws of war, conduct during these wars would have exhibited that 
rupture.
305
 This is not the case. 
Penal enforcement of jus in bello during these religious civil wars is illustrated in a case 
described in the autobiography of Marshal Blaise de-Monluc, who served in the French military 
from 1521 to 1574. After a victory near a certain town, two commissioners (military judges) 
were appointed, but additional commissioners soon had to be assigned because the first two 
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“execute[d] Justice upon the Catholics only”.306 Meanwhile, Monluc arrived in town and after 
failing to convince the commissioners to punish two prisoners, despite strong evidence that they 
committed infinite “Rapines and Violations,” he directly ordered these prisoners’ hanging.307 For 
such actions, Monluc was described by some as an unbiased commander who “hung disturbers 
of the peace from either side.”308 
The transition from knight-led to mercenary forces also did not result in complete disregard 
of the laws of war, among other reasons, because it was gradual.
309
 French noblemen, 
accordingly “continued to exhibit chivalric courtesy on the battlefield during both the Wars of 
Religion and the Thirty Years’ War.”310 Moreover, describing early-modern mercenaries as 
lacking commitment to the laws of war is an exaggeration. Mercenaries generally upheld POW-
related prohibitions.
311
 This signifies an important legal development. Originally only knights 
were eligible for POW status, and other captured enemy combatants could be executed even 
without committing a crime. Only in Early Modern Times was eligibility for POW status 
expanded.
312
 Thus, the transformation that armies experienced caused “[t]he knightly practices of 
warfare… to spread out and bec[o]me… the customs of the ordinary soldier, even if a mercenary 
and un-mounted”.313 Even violations of civilian protections were often not motivated by 
disregard of the laws of war. Because of the rapid increase in the size of armies, belligerents 
were unable to properly fund and supply their troops. Many atrocities were perpetrated by 
hungry soldiers who rampaged for survival.
314
  
To prevent such atrocities, European rulers attempted to improve military law-enforcement, 
often adopting new, extensive articles of war.
315
  Currently, the Swedish articles of war from 
1621, issued during the Thirty Years’ War, are often marked as the turning point in this regard 
and therefore revered as “the basis of… modern international humanitarian law.”316 In truth, 
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many such attempts and articles have been drafted earlier, including during the French Wars of 
Religion.
317
 Neither 1621 nor 1648 were turning points, because although penal enforcement of 
the laws of war gradually improved during Early Modern Times, “amelioration was not linear 
and even”.318 The current marking of a Thirty Years’ War-related event as the watershed is 
simply another example of the Westphalian Myth’s lingering effect.   
The French Wars of Religion ended with the regal Edict of Nantes, which referenced the 
international crime of truce/peace breaching, in declaring that whoever resumed fighting would 
be punished as “disturbers of peace” (“infracteurs de paix”).319 It further decreed certain 
“disturbanc[es]” committed during the wars as being too grave for amnesty. These included 
“rape, burning, murder, theft committed by treachery, ambuscade out of the line of regular 
warfare to gratify private revenge, contrary to the laws of war” (“contre le devoir de la 
guerre”).320 War-crime trials were subsequently conducted in accordance with the Edict.321  
Similar legislation can be found elsewhere. “The Act for the Pacification between England 
and Scotland of 1640” decreed that those who would resume fighting “ought to be punished as 
breakers of the peace” and that amnesty “shall not… extend to… theeves, robbers, murtherers, 
broaken-men [and] outlawers.”322 Seventeenth-century Scottish jurist, George Mackenzie, 
explained that “the Pacification only secure[d] against acts of hostility which were done in furore 
belli [fury of war]”, therefore its amnesty applied to killings “warrantable by the Law of Arms,” 
but not to “privet murder” (e.g. unauthorized execution of POWs) or “Rap[e] upon a Woman”.323  
2) The Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648) and the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648)  
The Eighty Years’ War was a rebellion of the Protestant Dutch against Catholic Spain, 
culminating in Dutch independence. Its later period blended with the Thirty Years’ War. In the 
initial stages of the Eighty Years’ War, Spain waged total war against the Dutch, but Dutch 
reprisals led the Spanish to recant and most of the conflict was conducted as between legitimate 
belligerents.
324
 Spain’s adherence to jus in bello is evident in King Philip II’s appointment, in 
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1574, of a judicial inquiry into accusations that the Duke of Alba, commander of the Spanish 
forces, and his soldiers had violated the laws of war by causing disproportionate harm to the 
civilian population. The Duke was acquitted, but “several of his senior officials were 
banished.”325 The fact that the Spanish officers’ punishment took the form of banishment 
indicates that the legal basis was outlawry-related, because the “banished” were outlaws whose 
lives had been spared.
326
  
Since the Eighty Years’ War was a religious rebellion, however, it is not surprising that 
when a Dutchman was accused of war crimes by Spain (and thereby deemed an international 
outlaw), his status as an ad bellum outlawed enemy was also claimed. This was the case with 
King Philip’s 1580 decree outlawing William of Orange. Philip’s decree accused William of 
treason, as William had originally served Spain. But William switched sides fourteen years 
before the decree and therefore this was probably not Spain’s primary reason for the decree. 
Indeed, the decree also accused William of more recent war-related wrongs, such as “persecuting 
all the good pastors, preachers, monks, and upright persons [and having] a number 
massacred.”327 Philip condemned William: “[F]or his evil doing: as chief disturber of the public 
peace… outlaw[ed] him forever [and] declare[d] him an enemy of the human race” and “to 
remove… his tyranny and oppression” promised a reward to anyone who would kill him.328 
William was subsequently assassinated by a Catholic Frenchman.
329
 
The following statement by contemporaneous Dutch jurist, Johannes Voet reveals that the 
Dutch also enforced ICL during that war:
330
  
[Soldiers sometimes] deprive [enemy soldiers] who surrendered of their lives in an 
abominable, spontaneous act against the accepted laws of war. Since today’s wars 
between civilized peoples do not permit such bestial conduct, and universal Christian 
charity and the gentleness due to the other oppose it, it was decreed that whoever 
committed an infamous act of this kind was to be banished from the allied provinces, 
after having been expelled from [military] service. Indeed, a soldier was [even] 
executed on July 10, 1638, because he had wounded two enemies, whom he knew well 
to be captives, to the extent that they both died, not long after, from the injuries. Almost 
the same punishment is set for those who, after a captive has paid off the ransom due 
according to the laws of war, release him without the permission of the commander of 
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the camp. For it may happen, that such captives are… guilty of [a grave] crime, whose 
punishment with adequate sanctions is of interest to the Republic and is amongst the 
duties of the commander…  
This brief report is extremely telling. First, although most of the passage refers to penal 
actions taken by the Dutch against their own soldiers, these soldiers’ wrong is described as an 
“act against the accepted laws of war [and] universal Christian charity”. This indicates that the 
Dutch applied a transnational doctrine (i.e. these penal actions should not be regarded as purely 
domestic measures). Second, as explained, the fact that the punishment was either banishment or 
death indicates that the wrong was considered outlawry-deeming. Third, there are not many 
historical records of proceedings against low-ranking soldiers that reveal the doctrinal basis for 
the punishment they received, because these were usually dispatched summarily. The case 
mentioned by Voet is, therefore, rare evidence of the application of the outlawry doctrine in such 
cases, suggesting that treating war criminals as outlaws was not simply political propaganda. 
Fourth, the last sentence refers to the duty of commanders to punish captured belligerent soldiers, 
pointing to a practice of punishing also enemy war criminals.  
Finally, the case mentioned by Voet was from 1638, during the Thirty Years’ War. Jurists 
currently regard that war as the archetypical total war.
331
 But despite the many unpunished 
atrocities of that war, current historical research shows that portraying it as entirely lawless is an 
exaggeration.
332
 Some enemy and compatriot war criminals were even prosecuted during that 
war.
333
 The period’s leading international jurist, Dutchmen Hugo Grotius, accordingly noted that 
it is “the usage of all Nations” to punish, on the basis of unwritten natural law, wartime enemy 
violators of such law.
334
 This statement is further evidence for ICL’s existence at the time. It also 
aids to refute the depiction of Grotius as the father of jus in bello, strengthening the conclusion 
that that depiction is a lingering effect of the Westphalian Myth.    
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The Thirty Years’ War 
Crime  
 
Punishment  
 
In 1633, during the Thirty Years’ War, French artist Jacques Callot made a series of etchings 
(each accompanied by a short poem) entitled The Miseries and Misfortunes of War.
335
 Callot 
attempted to realistically depict the War, describing first the descent of a group of soldiers into a 
life of (war) crime and, then, surprisingly, their punishment for their crimes (death by firing 
squad, e.g., in etching twelve). The poem accompanying the first etching depicting war crimes 
(etching four) describes, “The pretty name of booty their thieveries carry/They start fights 
intentionally as enemies of tranquility.” Namely, immediately after they had committed their first 
war crime (theft/pillage), they were deemed “enemies of tranquility” (outlaws). The poem 
accompanying etching thirteen further refers to them as “enemies of the Heavens who sinned [a] 
thousand times/Against the secret ordinances and divine laws.” 
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3) The English Civil War (1642-1651) 
 The English Civil War was a religious war. Still, ICL was enforced during much of it: “[i]ntra-
army offenses were governed by processes of trial and punishment set out in articles of war, 
while treatment of soldiers who fell into enemy hands was regulated by the [unwritten] laws of 
war [and] an enemy who had offended against them was liable to punishment.”336  
The trial of King Charles I (1649), following his defeat in this war, is another example of 
ICL’s pervasive reliance on the international outlawry doctrine. It also illustrates the reasons for 
the mistaken characterization of many past ICL cases as domestic legal measure. Since this was a 
non-international conflict, and Charles was tried for treason against his own country, it is clear 
why the ruling in his matter could be mistaken for a domestic case.  
But, the legal ground for trying Charles, advanced by the Parliamentary army, was an 
authority to prosecute “public officers [for] offence[s]… against the [unwritten] general law of 
reason or nations.”337 He was tried not by a Common Law court, but by a special tribunal of 
commissioners from the army and Parliament,
338
 which “adjudge[d], That the said Charles 
Stuart, as a Tyrant, Traitor, Murderer, and a Public Enemy, shall be put to Death.”339 At trial, he 
was also declared a “grand Disturber of the Peace”.340  
Charles was convicted of international crimes. Even his conviction for treason cannot be 
construed as the domestic form of treason because “king [Charles,] though imprisoned, was still 
nominally sovereign.”341 Two international norms underpinned the accusations that Charles had 
“traitorously and maliciously levied war against the present Parliament and the people therein 
represented.”342 The first was a non-monarchical variation of the transnational predecessor of the 
current domestic crime of treason.
343
 The second was the perfidious international crime of 
reinitiating fighting in violation of a truce/peace treaty (in Charles’s case, with Parliament).344  
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Charles’s murder conviction could not have been based on the common law crime of 
murder, because breaching the “king’s peace” was an element of that domestic crime, and 
Charles was King during the war.
345
 Charles was accused of murder for having engaged in 
“unnatural, cruel and bloody wars”346 and convicted on the grounds that the prohibition against 
murder “is universal… God’s law forbids it; Man’s law forbids it.”347  
Charles’s tyranny conviction was a manifestation of post-medieval reinterpretation of this 
international crime, reinstating the original Roman understanding of it as allowing the tyrant’s 
subjects to rebel against him, but maintaining tyranny’s perception as an international crime 
(fully consolidated only in late-medieval times).
348
 The tribunal’s Lord President, accordingly, 
ruled that Roman law (regarded as international law) was the basis for the tyranny charge against 
Charles, together with “precedents almost of all nations.”349  
King Charles’ Execution350 
 
Thomas Wilson lamented in a sermon, thirty-two years after Charles’ execution, that as a result 
of the trial, “much more then hath the Seven Years’ War, not Deposed him only, but Outlawed 
him, and defined him as an Alien, a Rebel to Law, an Enemy to the State.” 351 
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4) The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and Crimes Against Peace  
Jus in bello was generally honored in eighteenth-century Western wars, mainly due to: 
reforms in military justice (which, as discussed, begun earlier), the trauma of the Thirty Years’ 
War (whose horrors were exaggerated in the collective memory already in the seventeenth 
century), and the formation of properly-funded, professional, standing armies (which gradually 
replaced the poorly-supplied mercenary forces). “The officer class of these armies largely 
comprised [of] nobility [that] saw themselves as the heirs of the knightly tradition and [thus] 
generally conducted warfare… in accordance with the… law of warfare.”352 “There were, of 
course, instances of crime, rioting, rape, and pillage… but military codes provided harsh 
sanctions for these abuses [and] they were enforced”.353  
The transnational nature of the period’s penal enforcement of the laws of war is apparent in 
the common practice of contemporaneous belligerents to sign during wars treaties with their 
enemies, whereby, if soldiers unaccompanied by an officer and less than an agreed-upon number 
were captured, they could be “refused the treatment due to lawful enemies, and… punished as… 
banditti”354 and “freebooters. By such steps [they] prevented a multitude of disorders and 
enormities which entail ruin on the people”.355 Notice that the above-quoted, eighteenth-century 
sources equate suspected war criminals to pirates (“freebooters”) and brigands (“banditti”), 
demonstrating reliance on the international outlawry doctrine.  
The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) was a large-scale conflict. Because most European 
powers participated in it and because it was fought across the globe (in Europe, America, Africa, 
and Southeast Asia), it is sometimes referred to as truly the “first world war.”356 Despite its large 
scale, jus in bello was considerably enforced. For example, the military regulations of the 
Prussian King, Fredrick II, considered to be the model handbook of European officers at the 
time, prescribed corporeal punishment for “all [illegal] acts of violence, on whomsoever they are 
committed, by soldiers” and as soon “as a complaint of this kind is made against any soldier, he 
must be confined, examined, tried by a court-martial and sentenced.”357 Many war-crime trials 
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were conducted during this war.
358
 Furthermore, this war is a significant event in ICL’s gradual 
transformation into a global system, because the resources invested into it enabled imposing 
“European norms of military conduct on North-American warfare.”359  
It is currently often claimed that, unlike jus in bello, jus ad bellum was paid no more than a 
lip service in the eighteenth century, and rulers were considered to have unrestrained war-making 
discretion.
360
 It is also claimed that during that century the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity had solidified.
361
 But these are oversimplifications that fail to account for opposite 
eighteenth-century views and actions,
362
 and most notably, disregard the wide contemporaneous 
perception of Prussian King Fredrick II as an aggressor for invading Saxony in 1756.
363
 
Nineteenth-century historian, Thomas Carlyle, used a non-coincidental vocabulary to describe 
this consensus, which existed “over all Europe, England alone excepted,” stating that “[t]he 
extent of [Fredrick’s] sin… was at that time considered to transcend all computation, and to mark 
him out for partition, for suppression and enchainment, as the general enemy of mankind”.364 
Before that invasion, Fredrick drafted a manifesto listing several pretexts, but did not even 
wait for the ultimatum he gave the Saxons to expire before attacking. In response, Fredrick was 
declared an outlaw by the Protestant and Catholic princedoms of the Holy Roman Empire (who 
rarely agreed), with the support of other European powers.
365
 Although the coalition against 
Fredrick disintegrated before punishing him (due to the Russian Empress’ sudden death), the 
consensus regarding his culpability shows that sovereigns did not enjoy immunity from 
prosecution or unlimited discretion to initiate war.   
Fredrick’s outlawry was not a domestic measure because the Holy Roman Empire was not a 
single State. Moreover, as Emmerich de Vattel (the leading contemporaneous international jurist) 
elucidated, the law of nations was the basis for that outlawry--issued by the Holy Roman 
Empire’s princedoms with the support of “the most respectable powers of Europe”, as an action 
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“recommended for the interest and safety of nations to repress he who tramples on rules [i.e. 
rules of the law of nations] which constitute the unique foundation of their tranquility”.366  
Note that Vattel referred to Fredrick as a disturber of international peace. Indeed, throughout 
his work synonyms of “international outlaws” (such as, enemies of mankind) are used in 
reference to violators of international laws including war criminals,
367
 career felons,
368
 and rulers 
who violate ad bellum laws.
369
  
The following are among the rulers Vattel considered enemies of mankind for violating jus 
ad bellum: (a) warmongers
370
 and rulers who otherwise “tak[e] up arms without a lawful 
cause”371 or “without necessity”;372 (b) rulers who conduct a war of destruction or commit 
atrocities on a large scale;
373
 and (c) rulers who violate their treaty commitments.
374
 All three 
categories were raised as the basis for Fredrick’s outlawry.375  
As briefly demonstrated below, this combined accusation format has likely played a 
significant role in the history of the international crime of “aggression” (“crime against 
peace”).376 In jurisprudential writing, as Vattel’s work demonstrates, these were considered three 
distinct international crimes. The first is currently considered the origin of “aggression”. The 
second, rooted in tyranny, is what post-WWII jurists usually referred to by “aggression.”377 The 
third originated from the medieval war crime of breaching a truce/peace treaty.
378
  
It is currently assumed that all three charges, when made prior to Nuremberg, were political 
cheap talk. But Lesaffer, based on an examination of early-modern State practice related to peace 
treaties, rejected this account, at least regarding the third charge: “loyalty towards… treaties was 
based on natural law and therefore offered a strong basis for positive international law.”379 For 
early-modern jurists, “natural law was far more ‘law’ than natural law or even the law of nations 
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was to the nineteenth century deniers of the legal character of international law,”380 to the extent 
that violations of some natural laws were “punishable by sovereigns, even if not committed 
against themselves.”381 Lesaffer concluded that the Westphalian Myth’s lingering effect is the 
cause of the false contemporary historical account.
382
 
The charge of warring without a “just cause” became unreliable already in medieval 
times.
383
 It is likely that those wishing to make a more credible “unjust cause” charge began 
using the two other, more credible, charges. As a result, although in jurisprudential writing the 
three charges remained distinct, in practice they had merged considerably. Such a combined 
accusation is already found in Thomas of Marle’s case (1111-14), who was accused of (a) 
violating his commitment to cease fighting; (b) provoking wars; and (c) “massacring and 
destroying everything.”384 It is present in King Charles’s case where (a) the treason charge was 
partly for reinitiating fighting in violation of his treaty commitment, and (b) the murder charge 
was for engaging in cruel and bloody wars.
385
 It is present, as mentioned, in King Fredrick’s 
case. It is also present in subsequent cases. Napoleon, e.g., was accused of “violating the 
convention which established him in the Island of Elba” and of “reappearing in France with 
projects of disorder and destruction.”386 A similar format was initially advanced against the 
Kaiser,
387
 but because of opposition by positivist jurists,
388
 the Treaty of Versailles accused him 
only of “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”389 At the 
wake of WWII, the combined format was readopted; the Nuremberg Charter defined “Crimes 
Against Peace [as] planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances”390 and the Nuremberg tribunal 
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amalgamated these charges.
391
 In “the Ministries Trial”, Frederick’s and Napoleon’s cases were 
even explicitly regarded as precedents:
392
 
Is there personal responsibility for those who plan, prepare, and initiate aggressive 
wars and invasions? The defendants have ably and earnestly urged that heads of 
states and officials thereof cannot be held personally responsible for initiating or 
waging aggressive wars and invasions because no penalty had been previously 
prescribed for such acts. History, however, reveals that this view is fallacious. 
Frederick the Great was summoned by the Imperial Council to appear at Regensburg 
and answer, under threat of banishment, for his alleged breach of the public peace in 
invading Saxony. When Napoleon, in alleged violation of his international 
agreement, sailed from Elba to regain by force the Imperial Crown of France, the 
nations of Europe, including many German princes in solemn conclave, denounced 
him, outlawing him as an enemy and disturber of the peace, mustered their armies, 
and on the battlefield of Waterloo, enforced their decree, and applied the sentence by 
banishing him to St. Helena. By these actions they recognized and declared that 
personal punishment could be properly inflicted upon a head of state who violated an 
international agreement and resorted to aggressive war. 
Additional “cases [exist where] chiefs, or other high officers, of state were tried… for 
initiating... aggressive war [both] in the middle-ages [and] in modern times.”393 Other criminal 
cases, not against rulers, also demonstrate that it is “assumed, wrongly, that crimes against the 
peace were not recognized violations of international law until the post-World War II trials.”394 
Lesaffer concluded: “The continuity between the [early] modern era and the twentieth 
century seems to be greater than is normally accepted… Of course, the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries saw the high days of State voluntarism in practice and of positivism in doctrine, but 
that does not mean that there was no countercurrent.”395 This conclusion applies to the history of 
crimes against peace. 
5) The American Revolution (1775-1783) 
In the initial stages of the American Revolution, the British deemed the American forces 
outlaws (as rebels) and waged total war against them.
396
 In response, the American Founding 
Fathers framed the Declaration of Independence as an indictment against King George III for 
tyranny. The legal basis of the declaration was the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” and 
George was declared a tyrant for “refus[ing] [his] Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and 
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necessary for the public good” and for waging a war of destruction, as he “plundered our seas, 
ravaged our coasts, burned our towns [and] transport[ed] large armies of foreign mercenaries to 
complete the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of 
cruelty and perfidy… totally unworthy of the head of a civilized nation.”397 Although these are 
political statements, they demonstrate contemporaneous legal and political mindset and should 
not be dismissed. Furthermore, after the war’s initial stages, the sides agreed to treat each other 
as civilized nations. Subsequently, actions “against prisoners of war and enemy civilians were… 
regarded as crimes, and were often punished [and these practices] were too consistent and far too 
frequently repeated not to have some significance beyond internal control of one’s troops.”398 
The American Revolution  
  
Captain Lippincott was a royalist who executed an American POW. In response, Washington sent 
a letter to British General Clinton, implicitly threatening to execute British POWs in reprisal if 
Lippincott were not turned over to be tried by the Americans. Clinton replied (in his letter 
above
399) by referring to Lippincott’s act as an “outrage against humanity”. He also did not deny 
the Americans’ authority to prosecute Lippincott, but stated it was preferable that “violators of 
the law of war [were to be] punished by the Generals under whose power they act.”  
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6) The French Revolution (1789-1799) 
The French and American revolutions are commonly depicted as marking the end of the 
eighteenth century era of limited warfare because armed-forces became conscripted national 
armies with diminished commitment to the laws of war.
400
 But the effect of this transition should 
not be exaggerated: military characteristics changed gradually, and the commitment to the laws 
of war was not abandoned.
401
 Accordingly, cases of penal enforcement of the laws of war can be 
found during the French Revolution
402
 and subsequent wars.
403
    
The French Revolution was not merely an internal conflict; British and other European 
forces fought alongside the French King. The Revolutionary Convention declared the British 
Prime Minister, William Pitt, “an enemy of mankind”, so that “everyone [would] have the right 
to assassinate him” because he was a “tyrant.”404 Specifically, the revolutionists contended that 
Pitt was responsible for the persistent violation of the laws of nations by British forces.
405
 This 
declaration and similar actions indicate reliance on the international outlawry doctrine.
406
  
French King Louis XVI was tried by the Convention for tyranny and treason, and was 
convicted of treason. The basis for that trial was the law of nations and not domestic French 
law.
407
 During his trial, based on the “state of nature” conception, many revolutionaries 
advocated that human rights are inherent in the law of nature.
408
 They later abused this lofty idea, 
erecting upon it a doctrine whereby all who opposed equal rights--namely, all Royalists and their 
foreign and domestic supporters--were “enemies of humanity,” and outlaws (“hors-la-loi”), who 
could be tried and executed by summary military proceedings.
409
  
The French Revolution
410
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c. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
In the nineteenth century, ICL’s legitimacy was challenged by the rise of modern Positivism. 
As discussed, many positivists opposed punishment for violating norms not formally prescribed 
by domestic legislation. Some further rejected ICL either because they considered international 
law inapplicable to individuals or because they altogether dismissed the validity of international 
law.
411
 Despite such challenges, ICL persevered.  
One reason for positivism’s limited effect is its tendency to attribute significance to 
prevailing legal practice.
412
 For centuries, captured enemy violators of the laws of war were 
predominantly prosecuted by military tribunals. Due to that State practice, many nineteenth-
century positivists--while asserting that domestic civilian courts did not have authority to 
prosecute enemy war criminals--acknowledged, as customary law, the military tribunals’ 
authority to do so.
413
 For example, in Coleman v. Tennessee--concerning a Union soldier that 
murdered a Southern civilian during the American Civil War--the American Supreme Court 
ruled that, while the enemy’s domestic courts lacked jurisdiction, had that Union soldier “been 
caught by the forces of the enemy after committing the offense, he might have been subjected to 
a summary trial and punishment by order of their commander, and there would have been no just 
ground of complaint, for the marauder and the assassin are not protected by any usages of 
civilized warfare.”414 This position indicates an ICL-related practice before and during the 
nineteenth century. Other jurists, one should note, opposed this position, arguing that any court 
(military or civilian) is authorized to punish war criminals.
415
  
Another reason for nineteenth-century positivism’s limited impact on ICL was the 
persistence of a divide between military and civilian societies. As a result of the codification of 
domestic law, by the end of the nineteenth century, positivism supplanted natural law 
jurisprudence in domestic legal discourse.
416
 In contrast, throughout the nineteenth century and 
in the first half of the twentieth century, the laws of war remained predominantly the domain of 
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the military subculture and of its autonomous justice system.
417
 This subculture was conservative 
and tended to resist legal reform.
418
 Hence, the unwritten laws of war continued serving as its 
predominant basis for punishing war criminals.
419
 
Arguably, the main influence of nineteenth-century positivism on the laws of war was the 
role it played in advancing their codification.
420
 Codifying treaties were not, however, premised 
exclusively on positivism. The Martens Clause of the Hague Convention even implied that States 
and their agents were subordinate to unwritten, universal natural law.
421
 
In many respects, ICL expanded in the nineteenth century. Notably, slave-trading became an 
international crime, following an international effort to declare it “a form of piracy in the hopes 
of making slave traders, like pirates, hostis humani generis… subject to capture and trial in the 
court of any nation.”422 Slave-traders were also referred to as “piratical outlaws.”423 The analogy 
with piracy was not attributed only to similar practical difficulties of condemning the 
perpetrators’ ships; rather, it also derived considerably from viewing slave-traders as the enemies 
of mankind because of their violation of natural law (natural human rights).
424
  
Cases of penal enforcement of the laws of war exist not only from the first half of the 
nineteenth century,
425
 but also from conflicts during its second half and at the turn of the century, 
including the Crimean War (1853-1856);
426
 American Civil War (1861-1865),
427
 Franco-German 
War (1870-1871),
428
 Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878),
429
  Boer Wars (1880-1881, 1899-
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1902),
430
 Spanish/Philippines-American Wars (1898-1902),
431
 and Russian-Japanese War (1904-
1905).
432
 Ergo, the practice of punishing individual violators of the laws of war clearly persisted 
long after the rise of positivism. 
Evidence suggests that ICL continued to rest on an outlawry doctrine. This emerges from: 
the rationale underlying the outlawing of slave-trading, the attempt to punish Napoleon, the war 
crime prosecutions of the American Civil War and additional nineteenth-century cases.
433
  
Only at the turn of the twentieth century did ICL begin to be compromised because of 
growing endorsement even within the armed-forces of doctrines aimed at nullifying it. The 
Kriegsraison doctrine, whereby a State could disregard the laws of war if mandated by national 
necessity, gained increasing support, particularly in Germany.
434
 Support for the “Act of State” 
and “Respondeat Superior” doctrines also grew; the former barred the prosecution of war 
criminals if their crime had been endorsed by their State, and the latter prohibited prosecution 
when their crime was ordered by their commanders.
435
 British and American military law 
manuals adopted both doctrines shortly before WWI, and they remained there until nearly the 
end of WWII, sparking claims that they had become customary law.
436
  
Closer examination of State practice reveals that although weakened, ICL was never 
abandoned. Admittedly, during WWI, some German submariners who had participated in attacks 
against civilian ships were not tried by their British captors, and some British officials argued 
that international law demanded refraining from such prosecution.
437
 But after deliberation, the 
British government adopted an opposite position
438
 and punished other German soldiers for their 
war crimes.
439
 France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary also punished enemy war criminals, without 
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applying the Act of State and Respondeat Superior doctrines.
440
 Even Germany, after initial 
reluctance, punished enemy war criminals.
441
  
Outlawry was often explicitly cited as the basis for punishing war criminals during WWI. 
Phillipson, e.g., reported: “captured soldiers or sailors who have violated the laws of war are not 
entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; they are, on the contrary, liable to be tried by court-
martial as war criminals [Accordingly, in 1915, a] number of German airmen, who fell into the 
hands of the Russians after they had dropped bombs on the open town of Libau… were informed 
that on account of their illegitimate conduct they would be treated as common outlaws.”442 
WWI: The New-Zealand Herald 8 (February 5, 1915) 
 
Germans were not the only nationals to be declared international outlaws. In response to an 
attack against the British Embassy in Petrograd, in 1918, the British government sent an official 
dispatch to the Soviet government stating that unless those responsible for the attack were 
punished, Britain would hold the Bolshevik leaders individually responsible and “use every 
endeavour to have them treated as outlaws by the Governments of all civilized nations, and that 
no place of refuge shall be left to them.”443 In his legal analysis of this case, Lefroy stated: “[i]n 
the absence of any international court with power at its disposal to hale offending members of 
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foreign governments before it, and administer punishment, the last resort is outlawry, just as 
outlawry was the last weapon of ancient law… To pursue the outlaw, to knock him on the 
head… is the right and duty of every law-abiding man.”444  
WWI sources also reveal that “conventional” war criminals were equated with pirates and 
brigands. The underlying rationale was that soldiers who violate the laws of war place 
themselves “on a level with bandits and outlaws,” and therefore can “be summarily tried, 
condemned, and shot” or punished “by judicial tribunals.”445 
WWI: The Fielding Star (November 2, 1918) 
 
ICL was therefore not abandoned. The legal upheavals at the turn of the twentieth century 
should be more accurately understood as the product of a struggle between supporters of certain 
brands of positivism, seeking to restrict or abolish ICL, and ICL supporters.  
Admittedly, the Kaiser was ultimately not prosecuted (Holland refused to extradite him) and 
after the war German soldiers were prosecuted by a German tribunal for violating domestic 
German law in Leipzig.
446
 But by signing the Treaty of Versailles, the “German Government 
recogni[zed] the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals 
persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war,”447 and 
the authority of an international tribunal to prosecute the Kaiser “for a supreme offence against 
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international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”448 Similar provisions existed in the treaties of 
surrender signed with other States, and, in some of these States war crimes trials were 
conducted.
449
 Also, as a compromise between the allies and Holland, “Queen Wilhelmina 
interned the Kaiser in the province of Utrecht as ‘alien dangerous to the public tranquility’.”450 
Thus, formally, the Kaiser was, in fact, treated summarily like Napoleon.
451
 
The outlawry doctrine was also applied during WWII and, in its aftermath, supporters of 
both summary executions and judicial proceedings invoked that doctrine.
452
 In fact, the contrast 
between the two positions was not as sharp as currently portrayed, as seen in a report from 1945 
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson to President Truman, “on the legal basis for the 
trial of war criminals.” Although Jackson supported the trial of arch-war-criminals (deeming 
them “international brigands” for violating international law), regarding low-ranking enemy war 
criminals he argued that “field forces from time immemorial have dealt with such offenses on the 
spot” and suggested the “prompt resumption of summary dealing with this type of case.”453  
Understandably, many regarded the atrocities of the two world wars as proof that 
international law had always been ineffective and thus had never been truly positive law.
454
 From 
a historical perspective, however, this conclusion is wrong: “Any normative body of rules will 
invariably be broken, perhaps on a small scale or perhaps even on a much larger one, but this 
does not stop it from being a law in the sense of a prescription towards adopting a particular 
mode of behaviour, or an articulation of accepted values.”455 Many of those involved in post-
WWII war crime prosecutions did not consider them to be a break with the past. The Nuremberg 
Tribunal, e.g., rejected defendant claims (echoing positivist opponents of ICL) that it lacked 
authority to prosecute them for violating the Hague Regulations because these addressed only 
States,
456
 by stating that: “For many years past… military tribunals have tried and punished 
individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare… The law of war is to be found not only 
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in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal 
recognition, and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military 
courts.”457 Note that this ruling reveals that the contemporary narrative, which views ICL as a 
post-WWII creation, gained complete acceptance only sometime after WWII. 
6. Crimes against Humanity  
Some contemporary jurists acknowledge that war crimes were prosecuted even before 
WWII, usually assuming that this “category of international crimes gradually emerged in the 
second half of the nineteenth century”.458 But they still regard Nuremberg as a “crucial turning 
point [because] two new categories of crimes were envisioned: crimes against peace and crimes 
against humanity.”459 As already shown, the former were recognized before Nuremberg. As 
briefly shown below crimes against humanity were not a post-WWII innovation, either.
460
 
Jurists assume that the term “crimes against humanity” was first used in its current meaning 
in 1915, in an official Joint Protest by France, Britain, and Russia to Turkey, against the 
Armenian Massacre, which these States called the “new crimes of Turkey against humanity [and] 
announce[d]… that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the 
Ottoman Government… implicated in such massacres.”461 In 1919, the majority in a post-WWI 
allied legal commission employed synonyms of the term “crimes against humanity” when 
recommending criminal responsibility for “offences”, “outrages”, “violations” and “breaches” of 
“the laws of humanity”.462 These two failed initiatives to internationally criminalize “crimes 
against humanity” presumably inspired the post-WWII success.  
Earlier “references to ‘humanity’” are acknowledged with regard to violations of the laws of 
war. But they are dismissed for lacking the intention to indicate “a set of norms different from 
‘the laws and customs of war.’” 463 References to humanity are also acknowledged in the context 
of nineteenth-century humanitarian interventions. But, it is claimed to be “a leap of faith to take 
from such interventions evidence of an international crime [because] the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention was… not any rule for trying foreign nationals.”464  
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Even pre-1915 uses of the explicit term “crimes against humanity” are acknowledged. 
Presumably “Voltaire coined the term”, in the late-eighteenth century, in reference to crimes 
such as murder and it was used, subsequently, in such a context. But a clear explanation for the 
connection between the term’s contemporary meaning and its use in reference to seemingly 
domestic crimes is currently not provided.
465
 The term “crimes against humanity” is also known 
to have been used in nineteenth-century statements condemning war crimes, slave-trading, and 
colonial atrocities. But, these statements are considered mere moral condemnations.
466
  
ICL’s long history helps to connect the dots. The term “law of humanity” originally 
indicated international law, and “crimes against humanity,” and similar terms, meant 
international crimes. Accordingly, it was stated that: war crimes were acts “trampl[ing] on the 
laws of humanity,”467 “pirates… have for ages defied the laws of… humanity,468 and slavery was 
a “crime against humanity.”469 Felonies, such as murder, since they were considered 
international crimes, were referred to as “crimes contre l’humanité” long before Voltaire.470 
Felonies were also called “common law crimes,” (namely common to the laws of all States).471 
Atrocities had been referred to as “crimes against humanity” before 1915. Although the 
Boxer War (1900-1901) is rightly infamous for its colonial undertones, it was also a 
humanitarian intervention by a joint military force from Germany, Austria-Hungary, US, France, 
Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia in response to atrocities in which “more than 200 foreign 
missionaries and 30,000 Chinese Christians were killed.”472 In 1900, a “Joint Note” to China, 
signed by eleven States (the States of the joint force, Belgium, Spain, and Holland), demanded 
the punishment of the principal perpetrators, whose actions were deemed “crimes against the law 
of nations, against the laws of humanity”.473 Subsequently, unlike in the Armenian case, many 
perpetrators were tried and punished, including by the allies.
474
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The Boxer War 
 
Segments of the 1900 “Joint Note”, as published in The Oamaru Mail (13 February, 1901).475 
In various nineteenth-century interventions, we also find contemporaneous references to 
atrocities as crimes against humanity.
476
 Contrary to present-day belief, during such interventions 
the perpetrators of the atrocities were often prosecuted
477
--occasionally by military tribunals of 
the intervening powers.
478
 Some such interventions and subsequent trials were even in response 
to “peacetime” atrocities, which contradicts the Nuremberg Tribunal’s premise that such 
prosecutions were unprecedented.
479
 That ruling of the Nuremberg tribunal was probably 
influenced by a popular moderate positivist position that recognized only the authority to 
prosecute foreigners for wartime violations of international law (and for piracy).
480
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Perpetrators of Boxer atrocities were referred to as “disturbers of the peace,”481 Likewise, in 
a list from 1918, the principal perpetrators of the Armenian Massacre were referred to as 
“outlaws of civilization”.482 Such references demonstrate that the international outlawry doctrine 
was applied in such cases.  
Until the nineteenth century, the legal basis for military intervention was tyranny. As an ad 
bellum doctrine, it granted universal permission to fight the tyrant and his men. In the context of 
such interventions, rulers were, usually, declared tyrants for committing or condoning atrocities 
(namely, mass war crimes or felonies).
483
  
From the nineteenth century onward, the legal basis justifying military interventions was 
usually protecting humanity, not tyranny.
484
 But, the transition was not abrupt: we find pre-
nineteenth century sources referencing commitment to humanity
485
 and nineteenth century 
sources citing tyranny
486
 to justify intervention.  
In the nineteenth century, under the influence of positivism, support for universal 
jurisdiction diminished, together with support for prosecution based on unlegislated norms and 
for considering felonies international crimes.
487
 Some even opposed the prosecution of war 
crimes because they were unlegislated prohibitions.
488
 But, even among continental civilian 
jurists, a minority still supported universal jurisdiction for “common law crimes” (felonies).489 
Many more jurists asserted that States had authority to prosecute war crimes, despite these 
prohibitions being unlegislated. Their legal reasoning was that the different acts of war “contain 
all the essentials of criminal acts” such as “pillage, theft, incendiarism, violence, rape, robbery, 
assassination, maltreatment of prisoners and the like” and “[w]hat deprives [them] of the element 
of criminality is their conformity to the rules of international law”; therefore, when they are 
committed in violation of “the law of nations, they are analogous to ordinary crimes and may be 
punished as such”--namely, as “crimes under the common criminal law”.490 This position echoes 
                                                          
481
 Clements, Boxer Rebellion, 100.  
482
 Cited in Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide (2003), 314 n. 23. 
483
 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 557; Trim, “Intervention,” 21-47. 
484
 Trim, “Intervention,” 22. 
485
 Ibid, 38. 
486
 E.g., Sheldon Amos, Political and Legal Remedies for War (1880), 79. 
487
 Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction”, 99.  
488
 Garner, International Law, 473-474.   
489
 “Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,” 29 American Journal of International Law Supplement (1935): 571-579. 
490
 Garner, International Law, 473 (emphasis added). 
-DRAFT- 
 
73 
 
the medieval doctrine that considered unauthorized wartime taking of life or property (war 
crimes) as felonies.  
After WWII a nearly identical doctrine was advanced to justify prosecuting crimes against 
humanity. According to that doctrine, the prosecution of such crimes was not punishment based 
on retroactive law, because the acts listed as crimes against humanity were “common law crimes 
such as theft, looting, ill-treatment, enslavement, murders and assassinations, crimes provided for 
and punishable under the penal laws of all civilized States” (including Germany).491 In 
proceedings after Nuremberg, this doctrine became the basis for the post-WWII criminalization 
of both peacetime and wartime crimes against humanity.
492
  
Thus, the contemporary prohibition of crimes against humanity is not a post-WWII 
innovation. It gradually emerged, in the context of military interventions, based on the historical 
perception of the wrongs that comprise atrocities (murder, theft, robbery, arson, and rape) as 
international crimes, or crimes against humanity.
493
  
Nevertheless, there have been changes. Currently, a connection between the prohibition of 
crimes against humanity and human rights is considered essential.
494
 This connection did not 
always exist, but neither was it invented at Nuremberg. Post-WWII proceedings “had little to do 
with individual human rights,” and only the current human-rights-orientation of ICL has led to a 
“retrospective reinterpretation of [these proceedings’] impetus.”495 The difference between post-
WWII and contemporary ICL is most evident when the corresponding colloquial definitions of 
crimes against humanity are compared. According to their post-WWII colloquial definition, 
crimes against humanity were “common crime[s], punishable under municipal law [that 
transformed] into… crime[s] against humanity, [because] either by their magnitude [or] savagery 
[they] shocked the conscience of mankind”.496 By contrast, according to the current colloquial 
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definition, “[c]rimes against humanity are extreme, systematic or widespread violations of 
international human rights law that shock the human conscience.”497  
Three additional factors must be mentioned. First, unlike its colloquial definition, the formal 
definition of crimes against humanity (the acts listed as prohibited crimes against humanity), 
based on which individuals have been prosecuted, has not changed dramatically since the 
Nuremberg Charter.
498
 This means that the continuity is greater than the aforementioned 
compression of colloquial definitions conveys.  
Second, although most ICL applications even in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
were not human-rights-oriented,
499
 human-rights-oriented conceptualizations of crimes against 
humanity had been applied already during the French Revolution,
500
 in nineteenth century 
interventions,
501
 and regarding the slave trade.
502
 Namely, that change was the result of a 
nonlinear process.  
Third, contemporary jurists, when referring to the Joint Protest against the Armenian 
Massacre, usually make it a point to mention that the Russians initially offered using the term 
“crimes against Christianity”, but the French proposed the more inclusive term “crimes against 
humanity” instead. Such jurists wish through this mentioning to allude to international law’s 
globalization (which presumably occurred only in recent times).
503
 But, this occurrence actually 
demonstrates something else. Originally, ICL was a trans-Christian criminal justice system, 
whose community viewed itself as “mankind”/“humanity”. Therefore, cases, such as that of 
Thomas of Marle, exist where the terms “humanity” and “Christians” were used interchangeably 
and the term “enemy to the name of Christian” was used as a synonym of “enemy of 
mankind”.504 As ICL secularized during Early Modern Times, the term “Europe” gradually 
substituted Christendom as the term used--alongside “mankind”/“humanity”--in reference to the 
transnational community addressed by international law.
505
 Cases, accordingly, exist, such as 
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Napoleon’s case, where both the term “the Tranquility of the World”506 and the term “the 
Tranquility of Europe”507 were used. But, the Russian suggestion to use the term “crimes against 
Christianity” reveals that that substitution was not fully adopted even in 1915. Thus, it only 
demonstrates the protracted nature of ICL’s transition into a global system. This transition was 
also nonlinear, as evident in the existence of pre-1915 references to atrocities committed against 
non-Christians as crimes against humanity.
508
 In sum, over the course of the legal history of 
crimes against humanity changes often occurred in a protracted and nonlinear manner, and our 
recollection of that history differs considerably from reality.  
7. Current Historical Narrative  
Several factors that contributed to the pretermission of ICL’s long history have been 
mentioned thus far. First, the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War were exaggerated. Second, the 
Peace of Westphalia was an important milestone in the history of modern States. Third, the two 
preceding occurrences were relied upon in the nineteenth century to construct the Westphalian 
Myth, and with its aid, positivist conceptualizations of States and of international law were 
retroactively committed to memory. Fourth, by the turn of the twentieth century, anti-ICL 
positivist positions were accepted even within armed-forces. Fifth, the horrors of the world wars 
led many opponents and supporters of ICL alike to the exaggerated conclusion that international 
law had never been effective positive law.  
Two more recent factors also contributed to that pretermission. One was the Cold War, 
during which there was considerable loss of confidence in international law and a near-
termination of its application, including that of ICL.
509
 Another is the change in the legal 
background of jurists engaging in ICL. Western military law has been undergoing a process of 
“civilianization” since WWII.510 Also, when ICL resurfaced in the 1990s, it was no longer 
dominated by military jurists--civilian human-rights-oriented lawyers took the lead.
511
 Thus, the 
legal background of most military and civilian jurists currently engaged in ICL is primarily 
domestic jurisprudence. Individuals have an unconscious tendency to extrapolate from personal 
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experience and prevailing paradigms. This tendency, as mentioned, has led to the “Modern State 
Conception,” resulting in the misguided assumption that criminal justice is by nature a State 
function. This tendency also often leads individuals to project current paradigms and personal 
experiences onto the past.
512
 Contemporary jurists, accordingly, mistakenly assume that: (a) non-
domestic criminal law has long been an exceptional or non-existent phenomenon, (b) military 
justice was always a branch of the domestic legal system, and (c) a clear jurisprudential divide 
has long separated domestic from international law. Therefore, although ICL emerged 
triumphant at the end of the Cold War, the pre-WWII historical narrative of its opponents 
became the consensus. 
One clarification is in order, however. The change in jurists’ legal background was gradual. 
The horrors of modern warfare led to some civilian involvement in the development of the laws 
of war already during the late nineteenth century,
513
 and civilian involvement intensified with 
each world war.
514
 This involvement was influenced by the nineteenth-century rise of the modern 
international legal profession. By the early twentieth century, this mostly civilian profession held 
predominantly positivist views. But, unlike supporters of previously discussed brands of 
positivism, many members of this profession reinterpreted positivist premises, or incorporated 
natural law elements into their positions, to reclaim international law.
515
 Accordingly, although 
some such jurists accepted the positivist account of international law unquestioningly, unlike 
positivist opponents of ICL, they argued that the horrors of war affirmed the need to reform this 
law, to include individual responsibility for violations of the laws of war. Thus, already in the 
nineteenth century some pro-ICL jurists considered it non-existent.
516
 Other pro-ICL jurists, by 
contrast, who more aware of military practices, acknowledged ICL’s long history even after 
WWII.
517
 In sum, the rise of the contemporary narrative was a long, disorderly process, resulting 
from the actions of both opponents and proponents of ICL.   
8. The Harms of the Current Narrative  
Contemporary jurists do not blindly accept all nineteenth-century positivist narratives. 
Although historical inaccuracy alone warrants the debunking of the Westphalian Myth, it is no 
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coincidence that this occurred in parallel with the post-Cold War reawakening of international 
law. Those refuting the myth sought to strengthen the legitimacy of international law by showing 
that adherence to transnational legal norms and institutions was a longstanding social practice, 
and that a State with unlimited sovereignty never existed.
518
  
Nevertheless, ICL’s pre-Nuremberg history remains unacknowledged, and both opponents 
and supporters of ICL continue to assume that it was created only after WWII to punish 
individuals based on retroactive law, and thereby in violation of core principles of justice. ICL 
supporters are, thus, forced to justify ICL’s supposed past injustices and persuade skeptics that 
today ICL is far more just than it was at its “birth.”519 But legitimizing a system with an 
allegedly questionable track record is a difficult task,
520
 especially when opponents exploit the 
accepted narrative to assert that what was “born in sin” can never become just.521  
Two misguided assumptions with positivist origins explain why debunking the Westphalian 
myth has had little effect on ICL. One is the premise that criminal justice is by nature a State 
function; the other the belief that there is a longstanding clear jurisprudential divide between 
domestic and international law. Based on these assumptions, jurists tend to focus on the actions 
of international tribunals.
522
 Many even adopt an institution-oriented definition of ICL, as 
opposed to a broader, norms-oriented one. Under the broader definition, any case in which ICL 
norms are enforced should be regarded as an action of the international criminal justice system, 
even if adjudicated by a municipal court. By contrast, under the narrower institution-oriented 
definition, war crimes prosecuted in municipal courts are considered to be domestic actions. 
Only rulings rendered by tribunals that cannot be considered domestic organs (e.g., because 
judges are not all subject to a single sovereign) are regarded as ICL actions.
523
 Based on the 
institution-oriented definition, many jurists conclude that, regardless of any pre-WWII war 
crimes prosecution, ICL was born at Nuremberg, supposedly the first transnational criminal 
tribunal (or the second, for those who remember von-Hagenbach).
524
 ICL opponents further point 
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to such tribunals’ alleged novelty to support their claim that these tribunals, and ICL in general, 
are anomalies, placing on ICL supporters the heavy burden of justifying what is considered a 
deviation from the general norm.
525
  
But, the institution-oriented definition of ICL is flawed because its rests on false premises 
(already refuted in this article). First, until the nineteenth century there was generally no sharp 
distinction between international and domestic criminal law. Second, for centuries, when 
enforcing international laws, armed-forces considered their penal forums to be organs of a 
transnational criminal justice network.
526
 Thus, pre-WWII cases adjudicated by these military 
forums should be regarded as ICL precedents. 
An overlooked expression of the transnational network ethos is the fairly common, 
centuries-long practice of military powers to form transnational criminal tribunals to punish war-
related and intervention-related violations of international law. Scilicet, Nuremberg was not the 
first, neither only the second, transnational criminal tribunal. Prominent examples of such 
overlooked tribunals are the Imperial Chamber Court and Aulic Council (1490s-1806), which 
gradually transformed into international tribunals, as princedoms of the Holy Roman Empire 
became sovereign States.
527
 Their jurisdiction went beyond the non-penal, post-Westphalian 
authority, previously mentioned. These tribunals were originally created to punish “disturbers of 
the peace,” in the sense of individuals who initiated illegal wars (committed aggression) within 
the Holy Roman Empire’s realm, and they also had jurisdiction over the international crime of 
tyranny when it was committed by rulers of the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms.528 Prussian 
King Fredrick’s outlawry was, actually, a sentence rendered by the Aulic Council, subsequently 
confirmed by the empire’s princedoms and supported by other European powers.529 Although 
efforts to punish Fredrick failed, other sentences were successfully enforced, as Trim notes:
530
  
[T]he Imperial Aulic Council… had its composition altered at Westphalia, making it both a 
more representative and a far more consensual body. In consequence, in the late 
seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century it was more active and 
assertive, intervening [to] constrain tyrannical rulers. On numerous occasions over the 
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century following Westphalia, ruling princes were deposed, or suspended from power, by 
the Council, ‘for… disturbing the peace… and abuse of power.’ They included…William-
Hyacinth of Nassau-Siegen [who] ‘was sanctioned in 1709 for mistreating his Protestant 
subjects’ [and] [t]he ‘tyrannical Duke Karl Leopold of Mecklenburg’ [who was] 
‘eventually deposed in 1728’ on the grounds of his repeated attempts, using harsh 
measures, to deprive his subjects ‘of their age-old privileges, freedoms and rights.’ 
…[T]hese interventions… show that the notion… that some types of princely behavior 
were simply too extreme to be countenanced by other princes was widely accepted. 
Despite the Westphalian ‘myth,’ this remained true in the century after Westphalia. 
The Imperial Chamber Court and Aulic Council are only two examples of transnational 
criminal tribunals. Such (usually ad hoc) tribunals existed in every century, from the late Middle-
Ages onward.
531
 I avoided discussing the history of such tribunals at length, mainly because 
focusing on them would lend legitimacy to the flawed institution-oriented definition of ICL, 
which this article challenges.  
The narrow, institution-oriented definition reflects jurisprudential shortsightedness, even 
regarding current ICL. Even contemporary positivists acknowledge that occasionally more than 
one legal system applies to the same group of people. In these situations the competing legal 
systems often reach a compromise, whereby both systems agree on the content of the legal 
arrangement to be applied, but “agree to disagree” on the origins of individuals’ duty to abide by 
this legal arrangement, each one asserting that the obligatory force of its own laws is the source 
of that duty.
532
 A quintessential example of such a compromise is the relationship between the 
EU legal system and domestic European legal systems. Are the rulings of domestic courts 
enforcing EU directives considered the judicial action of the domestic legal system, or of the 
transnational (EU) system? The answer depends on who is being asked. Constitutional courts of 
member-States insist that domestic courts’ duty to apply EU law derives from domestic law that 
gives force to EU norms. The European Court of Justice maintains that these courts are duty-
bound to apply EU law because that transnational law supersedes the members’ domestic 
laws.
533
 Domestic rulings enforcing EU law should therefore be objectively labeled as 
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simultaneously the case-law of both the transnational and domestic legal systems. The same 
observation applies to ICL. Namely, even today, prosecution of core international crimes 
conducted at the State level should be considered the case-law of both the domestic and 
international criminal justice systems. 
The myopic view of ICL that overemphasizes the proceedings of international tribunals not 
only reinforces the disregard for its pre-WWII history, but also leads to the underestimation of 
ICL’s current effectiveness, in discounting the majority of ICL cases for not having been tried by 
international tribunals. For example, the prosecution of a few high-ranking officials at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo is a minor chapter in the saga of post-WWII prosecutions, the subsequent 
prosecution, in various countries, of tens of thousands of WWII perpetrators of core international 
crimes is simply usually overlooked.
534
 Similarly, current criticism of ICL’s effectiveness is 
often based on the fact that only a few cases have been prosecuted in recent decades by 
international tribunals.
535
 But, a survey revealed that the international pressure applied during 
1993-2008 to involved States to end impunity--through the conviction of 112 perpetrators of core 
international crimes, based on universal jurisdiction, mainly by international tribunals--resulted 
in, “[m]ore than 10,000 perpetrators [being] brought to justice in [involved] countries.”536 Thus, 
the excessive attention directed at international tribunals leads to an underestimation of ICL’s 
effectiveness, resulting, again, in an unjustified questioning of its legitimacy.  
Conclusion 
Myths are a powerful, persistent social force. Some can even be harmful, as they shape our 
outlook on important issues based on false information. Because myths can subconsciously 
affect even the behavior of those who are aware of their falsehood, it is often necessary to 
consciously combat their effect.
537
 
In recent decades, scholars showed that international law had suffered from the harmful 
effect of the Westphalian Myth. Exposing its fallacy aided to legitimize the now-flourishing 
international law: State sovereignty ceased to be conceived as a longstanding social fact, and 
international law is no longer viewed as a recent assault on that sovereignty.  
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But, the Westphalian Myth has had stronger ramifications than commonly acknowledged. 
Aided by other factors, it generated the “Nuremberg Myth,” according to which ICL is a post-
WWII creation, dismissing the relevance of pre-WWII cases to present-day ICL. This article 
refuted the claims currently presented as bases for that dismissal. It showed that ICL has 
developed in a process spanning centuries, continuously anchored in the same transnational 
doctrine and that throughout its long history ICL enforcement was far from negligible. The 
current fixation on international tribunals was also shown to be misguided.  
The article does not intend to belittle the significance of the international criminal tribunals 
created since WWII. Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Myth’s harmful effects cannot be ignored. It 
leads to the disregard of most ICL cases (those adjudicated at the State level), which results in a 
grave underestimation of ICL’s effectiveness, past and present. Furthermore, the related 
mistaken view that ICL was born in sin cast doubt about its capacity for justice. For all these 
reasons, and for historical accuracy, the Nuremberg Myth must be set aside and the true, 
centuries-long history of ICL acknowledged.  
